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I.

THE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF WAR.

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Much as we detest war because of its horrors and many evils, we must admit that it has some moral value for those who, as a last resort, wage it for a just and righteous cause. It is different, however, with those who violate the rights of others. For them war is demoralizing, degenerating. War unbridles the natural passions and brings out the worst, as well as much that is good, in human nature. Coningsby Dawson concisely expressed our thought when he wrote: "War can never be anything but beastly and damnable. It dates back to the jungle. But there are two kinds of war. There is the kind that a highwayman wages, when he pounces from the bushes and assaults a defenseless woman; there is the kind you wage when you go to her rescue. The highwayman can't expect to come out of the fight with a loftier morality—you can."

In the recent war, in which we took part for the welfare of humanity, for the principles of Jesus Christ and for the promotion of the Kingdom of God, the great majority of our people manifested to a surprising degree many noble qualities, as virility, courage, self-sacrifice, generosity, loyalty, coöperation, solidarity, temperance, sympathy, and simplicity and frugality

of life. Many learned as never before the meaning of service and sacrifice. They showed capacities for unselfish devotion and vicarious living and dying which we did not know they possessed. Even people, who had been worldly, or pleasure-seeking, willingly practiced self-denial in no small way, and gave lavishly of their means, their time and their strength for the sake of the cause, and to minister to the needy and the suffering. And who shall tell of the heroism and the consecration of the boys at the front!

Now that the war is ended, the very timely and pressing question arises, Is there to be a moral lassitude and a dropping back into the old selfish life, or are we going to conserve what has been gained by the war, and keep up the practice of the virtues then brought into prominence and endeavor to direct the efforts of the people for the accomplishment of still greater things for the good of humanity? The words of Prof. William James written years ago come to us with new force: "What we need to discover in the social realm is the moral equivalent of war: something heroic that will speak to men as universally as war does, and yet will be compatible with their spiritual selves as war has proved itself to be incompatible."

The work of the peace-makers is not so much negative as it is positive. It is not enough for them to decri war. They must do constructive work; they have the continuous and creative task of rebuilding the world as it ought to be. In order that there may be real peace wrongs must be righted, and environment greatly improved. Much yet remains to be done before there can be a complete reign of righteousness which is the foundation of peace. The sinews of war are not to be destroyed, but are to be turned to some good account and used for the advancement of the race. The sword is not to be left to rust, but is to be beaten into the plowshare. And the impulses and energies of men that lead to wars are not to be eliminated, but are to be directed along channels of usefulness.

The universe is not static, but dynamic. Perpetual struggle is the universal law of nature. For thousands upon thou-

sands of years man fought his way upward. Self-preservation demanded that he fight against carnivorous beasts, and that he struggle for food and shelter. Conflict of one kind or another has always been and still is an unavoidable part of life. The impulse to conflict is instinctive and deep-rooted in human nature, and, while it may be abnormally developed, is not in itself an evil or abnormal. Not only is this true of the "natural" man, but also of the Christian, of the one who has been regenerated, who has become a new creature in Christ Jesus. In the New Testament Christians are admonished to engage in warfare, in the warfare against evil. Paul spoke about the need of putting on the armor of God, and of wrestling against wickedness, and at the close of his life, with a sense of satisfaction, he declared that he had "fought a good fight." No, the combative instinct in man is not to be destroyed, but is to be controlled, sanctified and rightly used.

The struggling life is the strong life, and the life that does things. Vigorous men with a love of adventure, with a desire for difficult tasks and heroic feats, look upon Utopias as intolerably dull, and life there as being soft and enervating. Even with life as it now is, Prof. William James in his essay on "The Energies of Men" says: "As a rule men habitually use only a small part of the powers which they actually possess and which they might use under appropriate conditions." "It is evident that our organism has stored up resources of energy that are ordinarily not called upon, but that may be called upon." "Compared with what we ought to be we are only half awake." Is war the only outlet for man's combative instinct, and is war the only thing that will arouse slumbering energies and call forth unused resources? Are these impulses and powers either to lie partly dormant, or be expended in bloodshed and destruction, or are they to be productive and minister to the welfare of humanity? Is there some thing that will take the place of war and foster the martial virtues without the martial vices, and be a blessing instead of a dreadful calamity? If we do not try to find an answer to this question, if we do

not earnestly endeavor to find a substitute, or substitutes, for war, we break faith with the millions who have been slain on the battlefields, and harden our hearts to the sufferings of other millions who have had heart-breaking experiences.

The expression, "The Moral Equivalent of War," was first brought into prominence, if not first used, by Professor James in his famous address on this subject in 1898. He suggested that we have a conscription of the younger men, under army discipline, for the purpose of doing difficult work of constructive value, such as making roads, digging tunnels, mining coal, erecting buildings, constructing bridges, making canals, draining swamps, irrigating land, etc. While thus engaged in useful undertakings, on a large scale, "the military ideals of hardihood and discipline would be wrought into the growing fiber of the people." There is much to be said in favor of his plan, but the idea of conscription is not popular. Our government has been deservedly commended for the construction of the Panama Canal, which is of great use to the world. Such difficult, hazardous and beneficent enterprises as that should call forth the enthusiasm of all our citizens and receive their hearty support and coöperation. Many people in our country, especially in the large cities, are living in houses that are small, dark, poorly ventilated and in other ways unsanitary, and which, because of crowded conditions, are not conducive to good morals. Old dilapidated houses with scarcely any conveniences are still occupied by the poorer classes, but battleships in a couple of decades become antiquated and are discarded. A campaign for better housing conditions, with some adequate plan under the direction of the government for the razing of unfit houses and the building of a larger number of better ones, should receive the encouragement of rich and poor alike and be backed up by their united efforts.

In gaining dominion over nature man has yet great things to accomplish. Parts of the earth, though fertile and productive, remain uninhabitable by civilized people. The fact that the Panama Canal Zone was made a safe place in which to live

shows that much can be done to make the tropics a fit place for the abode of the white man. Parts of South America, presumably of vast wealth, have not yet been explored, much less rendered habitable. Here is a field for great and daring feats. It is surprising that more persons have not followed the example of the strenuous and fearless Roosevelt, who when he had no San Juan hills to ascend, no congress on his hands, no political foes to squelch, and when the cause of just and honest government did not demand his immediate attention, even though well advanced in years, went on an exploring expedition into the heart of South America. From the tropics of that continent, and also from other places, comes the challenge to subdue nature, not for the enrichment of individuals, but for the benefit of mankind.

It is indeed high time that man is learning that his worst foe is not man, but that there are other more deadly enemies, such as climatic conditions and diseases. Organized efforts have been made and are still being made to fight tuberculosis, and with encouraging results. But the white plague is by no means conquered, and not only the medical profession, but all other persons, as they value life, should wage a still more energetic warfare against this and other diseases.

When we come to the social problems and ills of an economic or moral nature we find still greater undertakings, more gigantic tasks. There are strikes and labor troubles without number. These can be settled neither by insisting that the demands of the employed be continually granted, nor by upholding the employers in a firm, defiant attitude against the working classes. "Collective bargaining" on the part of trade unions with capital is not satisfactory, and arbitration does not always bring about desired results. Under present conditions it is possible for a comparatively small number of men to hold back some of the supplies of the necessities of life from a city like New York for long enough time to cause great suffering. Especially now when the world is so much in need of food, clothing, fuel, building materials, and many other

things, the production and distribution of these things should not be interfered with by strikes and lockouts. If there is not to be eternal and wasteful warfare between capital and labor we must have industrial democracy. As in the political world autoocracy has given way to democracy, so in the industrial world a similar change must take place. The laboring man should not only be permitted to help determine under what conditions he will work, but should also have a voice in the management of the business enterprise and assume his share of the responsibility for its success. The democratizing of industry is now making a small beginning, but the task of carrying on this process by evolutionary methods to a successful conclusion is greater than the conquering of a nation and of such far-reaching beneficent results, that it is worthy of consideration as a moral equivalent of war.

Such social reforms as that of temperance also serve, in part at least, as moral equivalents of war. The battle against strong drink has indeed been a valiant one, and, while victory is now assured, is not yet ended. Even the liquor men are about ready to acknowledge that the prohibitionists are as good fighters as the American soldiers who turned the tide of the world war, and feel that they are being more effectually routed than was the German army. In such campaigns as this there is ample room for the exercise of the combative side of man's nature, under proper control, in the cause of righteousness.

There are other monstrous evils, as the social vice and gambling, that should call forth the righteous indignation and the fighting propensities of all Christians and of all loyal citizens. The social evil has been the cause of more suffering and more sorrow than all the wars put together, and, especially as far as morals and religion have been concerned, infinitely more destructive. Among its victims are many innocent ones as well as the guilty. For the sake of the present generation and for the sake of generations yet unborn, may the forces of righteousness be marshalled, and unceasingly and relentlessly carry on a campaign against the great black plague.

Along the line of social service there are many commendable projects to make environment more wholesome, to improve social conditions, to make the world a better and safer place in which to live, that there may be less crime and less poverty, and better opportunities and more incentives for people to lead the higher life. Such things as the excessive mortality of young children, the supplies of good milk and pure food, child labor, adequate school facilities, playgrounds and suitable places of recreation and amusement for both young and old, are receiving the attention of people as never before, and legion are the organized movements for the good of humanity. "The chivalry which lays down life for a great cause is worthy of all honor; so also is the devotion of those who die daily, year after year, in the service of mankind."

The importance of Americanizing the millions of foreigners who are now living in our midst, and who will come to us in the future, has been accentuated by the war. Teaching them the English language, inducing them to break away from undesirable traditions and customs of their native lands, giving them a knowledge of American institutions and ideals, and helping them to become useful and loyal citizens of our country, is an undertaking as necessary as it is big.

It has been urged, and with good reasons, that the missionary enterprise, including the work of home and foreign missions, should be regarded as the moral equivalent of war. About two thirds of the human race are not Christians. Religions other than Christianity are strongly entrenched in large parts of the world, and, at least one of them, Mohammedanism, has always been and still is militant and defiant. And even in Christian lands are many who are not followers of Jesus Christ. Sin, ignorance, superstition, indifference, false conceptions of religion and life are some of the obstacles to be overcome. Surely here is a cause big enough and worthy enough to call forth the latent powers and the enthusiastic support of all Christians and arouse the Church to move like a mighty army. The cause of missions, however, is not making

the stirring appeal to people that it ought to make. And this is not altogether the fault of the Church members. In the home land there is a waste of energy and resources by the support of too many small weak churches. This is not encouraging either to the people in the churches or to those outside of them. In many places there are now a number of congregations that must struggle for their very existence, where there ought to be fewer churches, but those large and strong. In that way the community itself could be better served and much more done for missions. Then, too, the missionary forces of the Protestant churches are scattered. One denomination sends out a small group of missionaries to one place, and other denominations have different mission stations in other fields, and even the Christian part of the world does not hear or know much about them, whereas united efforts would attract more attention, enkindle more enthusiasm and receive heartier support. If, for instance, the Protestant Churches of our country would unitedly send out a call for ten thousand missionaries to be sent, fully equipped, to some particular mission field, great interest would be taken in such a project, and large contributions would probably be forthcoming even from persons who are not professing Christians. Efforts are already being made to have the work of missions undertaken on a larger scale, and carried on in a more statesmanlike manner.

We have mentioned a number of different kinds of enterprises, and still many others are worthy of mention, that press their claims to be the moral equivalent of war. But none of these vast undertakings are antagonistic to each other. Rather are they dependent on each other. The success of one helps the success of the others. And all have valuable contributions to make for the welfare of humanity, and for the upbuilding of the Kingdom of God on earth. The Kingdom of God has to do, not only with the so-called "sacred" or religious side of life, but with all phases and activities of life. And whatever is of use to man helps promote the interests of that Kingdom. The coming of the Kingdom means the divine rule in the

hearts of men and the bringing under God's reign of all human interests and relationships. The establishing of that Kingdom is inclusive of all useful enterprises of whatever kind they may be. And now we are prepared very confidently to say that the one panacea to abolish war and be its moral equivalent is the building up of the Kingdom of God on earth. Certainly here is something big and "heroic" that should "speak to men as universally as war does," and be "as compatible with their spiritual selves as war has proved itself to be incompatible." In the spiritual warfare involved in the establishment of the Kingdom is ample room for, and great need of, the martial virtues and the most vigorous life. In the building up of the Kingdom there are so many very definite and concrete things of commanding importance to be done that some of them, at least, should appeal to the reason and stir the emotions of the various classes of people. Anew let us raise the cry, "The Kingdom of God is at hand," and in the faith of the Christ who made its founding the one object of His life, who lived and died for it, let us proclaim its principles and set it forth as the only possible hope of the world.

If the League of Nations will be adopted, if governments will be evolutionary and not stationary, if the same code of ethics will be applied alike to nations and to individuals, so that the nation that goes to war for conquest and plunder will be branded and punished as a criminal and when repentant forgiven—those things will in part serve as preventatives of war, but as Lord Bryce has said: "The one sure hope of a permanent foundation for world peace lies in the expansion throughout the world of the principles of the Christian Gospel."

The Mexican situation is again becoming acute. Poor, ignorant, deluded Mexico, with millions of her population illiterate and without a knowledge of the pure Gospel, and with many of her people not entirely civilized—what is to be done with her? Instead of sending a military force against her, it would be better to send an army of teachers and missionaries

to enlighten and evangelize those of her people who are ignorant and who are not Christians. In the spirit of love and helpfulness could not this be done in a way that would not be offensive to the people, but meet with their approbation, and eventually result in their having goodwill and not enmity towards us?

Percy MacKaye in his little book, "A Substitute for War," says that we are suffering from the disease of "drab," that many useful undertakings are carried on in too commonplace and unattractive a manner, and that the dove is too anemic to be the symbol of peace. "The armies of peace have a nobler kind of work to do than the armies of war, and their work often requires as much courage and self-sacrifice. Yet they do not fascinate as war fascinates, for the reason that they are drab." War is able to make its strong appeals because it is dramatic, spectacular, exciting, full of action. It is "the enacting of a national drama in which the people themselves participate." The militarist well knows the value of flags, parades, fife and drum music, and decorations for bravery.

For years social reformers advocated the adoption of a new charter for the city of Saint Louis, but nothing was accomplished until the "Pageant and Masque of Saint Louis" was presented by seven thousand five hundred performers and a chorus of six hundred persons. That united the citizens, aroused a greater community spirit and pride, brought about the adoption of the charter and resulted in much good in other respects.

It seemed but a trifling thing to have the street cleaners of New York City wear white uniforms, but it helped to beget in those men an *esprit de corps*, and, together with parades, gave them in their work a new sense of dignity.

By use of the dramatic art, by the use of martial music, and in other ways, is it not possible to popularize beneficent enterprises and arouse more enthusiasm for them?

In our efforts to abolish carnal warfare and substitute for it the building up of the Kingdom of God, there are many rea-

sons for encouragement. God lives, the world moves, and man has been learning and growing. The Church of Christ is girding itself for greater tasks than ever before, as is evident from the great "Forward Movements" already launched by the different denominations. The recent war broadened men's visions and deepened their thinking. It led them to think of world problems and to become patriots of the world, and made them feel as they did not in the past the need of, yea the necessity for, universal brotherhood. Moreover, the outcome of the war, the victory for justice, righteousness and freedom, vindicated the moral order of the universe, and shows that God does reign. Mindful of these things, and with the savagery of war still fresh in their memories, people are now ready, as they were at no previous time, to "seek first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness."

BALTIMORE, Md.

II.

THE LIMITATIONS OF GOD.

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A Conference such as this, standing as I believe it does, for complete liberty of theologizing, is an institution characteristic of the modern spirit in Church and State. The discovery has long since been made—though unfortunately in times of stress likely to be to a greater or less degree forgotten—that in the political life of a people, any attempt, however well intended, to stifle the expression of opinion, merely forces the discussion into underground channels, and thus aggravates the distemper of the body politic, while at the same time delaying public acceptance of so much as may be true in the suppressed propaganda. So, too, in the theological and religious experience of mankind, the persistent effort—whether by the use of fire and the gallows, or by the milder and seemingly gentler compulsion of anathema and epithet—to prevent inquiry concerning the tenability of traditional doctrines, has had most regrettable consequences, as almost every page of civil and ecclesiastical history will bear witness.

In the collect for the Church which in many of our congregations is read every Lord's Day, there seems to me to be no more necessary and appropriate petition than this: "Deliver her from false doctrine. . . ." For the Church has had, and no doubt still has, a great deal to unlearn. But if men are to unlearn old error and to apprehend new truth, or even if they are merely to retain their interest in the problems of theology in an age that is impatient of esoterism and demands open and candid discussion of all issues, they must learn to break through the taboos which, even after the cessation of physical

persecution for heresy, still interfere in some measure with effective coöperation in the quest of truth.

In the treatment of the subject assigned to me by our committee, I shall, accordingly, proceed on the assumption that in this presence, one may unbosom himself of his most individualistic reflections, provided that they are sincere and reverent strivings after truth. For in this presence epithets will not be made to do service in the stead of arguments; while merely to label an opinion with the name of some ancient heresy will not be regarded as a sufficient refutation; neither will appeals to the authority of Pope or Council, of Book or Creed, be employed for the purpose of preventing free discussion.

It may be expedient to remark, by way of further preamble, that the wording of my subject as printed in our program is not of my own devising. It no doubt conforms very well to the principles of the psychology of advertising, being a very effective legend to attract the attention of the theologically-minded. From other points of view, a somewhat different phraseology might, however, be preferable. For, in the first place, there is likely to be a feeling that any discussion of the "limitations of God" ought to be preceded by an inquiry concerning the limitations of man, and especially of the man who has the temerity to undertake such a discussion. So far, of course, as *the man* is concerned, the objection may be well taken; but so far as it concerns man in general, we cannot grant it. For the traditional affirmations that God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, eternal, and infinite are themselves the product of human thinking, in exactly the same sense as our earnest and sincere twentieth century affirmations and denials concerning God and His attributes.

In the second place, the phrase "limitations of God" may tend to produce in many of us the sort of emotional reverberations that make for the inhibition of clear and logical thinking. Such words as Eternity, Infinity, and Omnipotence, written with initial capitals and applied to Deity, have a certain "pathos," they have, so to speak, an emotional as well as an

intellectual connotation. There may, however, be less likelihood of arousing these inhibitory emotions, if we amend our subject so as no longer to read the Limitations of God, but rather the Limitations of Goodness, or still better, of Good-Will.

For this shall, as a matter of fact, be the real subject of our discussion. We are conscious of good will in ourselves and in men and women around about us. It may indeed sometimes be eclipsed; it may at times, and perhaps always, be weaker than it ought to be; nevertheless the existence of good will is undeniable. There are, however, some things which this Good-Will, as we know it in ourselves and in others, is unable to accomplish. Good-Will would save the drowning man; it would turn aside the tornado; it would prevent the occurrence of destructive earthquakes and the pitiless eruptions of volcanoes; it would utterly destroy disease-producing bacteria; it would put into the hearts and minds of men so much sound sense that they would no longer oppress and destroy one another—all this, and much more, human good-will would do, *if it could*.

This brings our problem into clear perspective: Is there a Good-Will, human or superhuman, which is able to do that which ought to be done, but which, as a matter of sorrowful experience, is not done? Is there a Benevolent Power sufficient to abolish at one stroke all the evils which now exist? If these questions must be answered in the negative, as I fear they must, we are committed to the theory that God is "finite," that He is not, in any really significant sense of the word, *omnipotent*. Thus the issue is disentangled from all others. It does not imply any specific definition either of God or of that which is not God. For whether we limit Good-Will to humanity, or believe in the existence of a Good-Will that is higher-than-human, whether we assume this Good-Will to be a Person, or an impersonal Force, or merely the sum-total of all good instincts, impulses, desires, affections and purposes,—or in whatever way we may define our God, so long as the quality of good-

ness is the *essentia* of the definition, the problem remains in principle the same: Is Good-Will omnipotent? Are all the energies of the universe subject to the control and in the service of goodness? And the answer, too, remains the same. There are forces, conditions, necessities in the world of man which are evidently beyond the control of Good-Will.

It cannot be too frequently repeated, however, that in this discussion the meaning of the term *God* is assumed to be *Good-Will*. If this is forgotten for but a moment, the argument is sure to be misunderstood. It is the more necessary to insist upon this because the sacred name is employed so variously in current usage. In particular, the metaphysical interest and the ethical interest demand quite different conceptions of deity. The metaphysician is seeking for the solution of ultimate problems. He wishes to have a unified view of the world. He is seeking answers to the questions "How?" and "Why?" For the metaphysician, accordingly, God is Ultimate Reality. God is First Cause. God is the One which is underneath the many and gives them being. Or, God is the All, the totality of that which is. If the God idea is approached in this way, if it is postulated to meet the needs of the human personality in its moods of wonder and speculative reflection, there is, of course, no meaning in saying that God is limited. For, by definition, God is precisely that which is not limited, the Absolute. Thus men who are dominated by the metaphysical interest, and whose conception of deity has been formed in an effort to satisfy this interest, find the notion of a "Finite God" entirely unrewarding, and they may even consider the phrase a contradiction in terms. The religious interest, too, is closely allied with the metaphysical; the mood of worship is near akin to that of wonder and speculative thinking. Religion, indeed, is always poetical in its expression. And the theology which best serves the ends of poetry is, of course, the pantheistic. For pantheism is the natural outcome of a quest for God which is dominated entirely by the metaphysical interest.

But the ethical approach to the conception of deity is quite different. And, whatever may be said of other religions, Christianity is an ethical religion. The Christian postulates God, not as an ultimate explanation, but as an ultimate moral ideal. Whenever, indeed, the metaphysical interest intrudes into Christian thought, it appears as an alien and disturbing force. It tends, in particular, to resolve the difficulty which our unsophisticated common sense finds in the idea of Omnipotent Goodness by qualifying the latter half of the phrase. That, as you remember, is what is done in historic Calvinism. For it the goodness of God is a goodness quite other than, quite different from that which we know in man. It cannot be measured by the same standards. In short, it is not goodness at all in our sense of the word, but rather a mere arbitrary self-pleasing. And this is not merely the consequence of Calvin's emphasis upon predestination. Any theology of omnipotence, unless indeed it refuse to face the problem of evil and take refuge in obscurantism, must, in effect, limit the divine goodness.

To whatever conclusion our inquiry may lead us, we, however, I am convinced, will hold fast to the proposition that God is good. With this as our fixed point of departure, the outcome of our inquiry into the possibility of reconciling in our thought of God the attributes of omnipotence and goodness will then depend upon the sense in which we employ the former term.

There is, first of all, the popular impression that when God is said to be omnipotent, the meaning of the affirmation is that He is able to do anything that may be mentioned. An impression of this sort underlies the argument for universalism, as well as that for the non-reality of evil. God, it is said, inasmuch as He loves all, must desire that all men be saved. But, since He is omnipotent, He can save all. And therefore all men will be saved. If the omnipotence of the good is assumed, the position of so-called Christian Science can be justified in the same way. Since God is perfectly good, He does not de-

sire that any of His creatures should suffer pain. God, however, is all-powerful; what He wishes to do He can do, and what He does not approve, He need not permit. Therefore, in spite of the testimony of vibrating nerve and twitching muscle, there really is no pain; pain is merely an illusion of mortal mind. Unfortunately, however, for this dialectic, it is possible by this same argument to demonstrate the non-reality even of this self-same "illusion of mortal mind." For such an illusion is a thing of evil, and therefore cannot be tolerated by Omnipotent Goodness.

But such a *reductio ad absurdum* shows, not only the folly of Eddyism as a theory of the world, but also the logical impossibility of the popular notion of omnipotence. For, not to elaborate the obvious unduly, if by omnipotence we mean the ability to do literally anything and everything that can be mentioned, or even if it mean the ability to do anything and everything that *ought* to be done, then omnipotence is certainly not an attribute of Good-Will. There are too many evils upon the very surface of reality for any one seriously to maintain that it is.

This popular notion of omnipotence is, however, not the one which has been employed by really competent thinkers. The masters of theology have always seen the necessity of defining this attribute of deity very carefully. In the first place all theologians are agreed that omnipotence does not include the ability "to actualize a contradiction." Even for the Omnipotent One there are *logical* impossibilities. Again most theologians have taught that moral distinctions are not subject to the will of God. Even omnipotence could not make right wrong and wrong right. These qualifications of the idea of omnipotence I have elsewhere called the "logical limitation" and the "ethical limitation."¹

In the light of what has just been said about the meaning of omnipotence, our problem may now be restated. Supposing

¹ *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XVI, p. 419.

the ethical and the logical limitations of the conception of omnipotence to be granted, we must now inquire whether it is necessary, in view of the dread reality of sin and suffering, that we qualify the conception in any other way. The theological finitist insists that a further qualification is necessary. Having limited the Almighty by the law of contradiction and the law of love, we must also limit Him by the law of time. Events do not take place arbitrarily; each is not produced by a separate volition of Deity. Nature has no mercy; makes no exceptions; does not turn aside to avoid running over anyone. But to say that events take place in accordance with law is equivalent to the proposition that the temporal order of events is fixed. So far as we can see, God does not change this order; and therefore we infer that He cannot change it. His purposes are not accomplished *instantly*, but in the course of a process. Indeed, unless history is to be resolved into a mere make-believe upon the part of Omnipotence, God's limitation by time must be conceded. We have a war, a murder, a suicide, a destructive tempest, an earthquake, a volcanic eruption—all phenomena which, considered as isolated events, clearly ought not to be. How then shall we reconcile them with the governance of a God who is good? If we may say that God is bound by time, in other words, that the evolutionary process is real and not merely apparent, then we can frame a satisfactory theodicy. Otherwise not; for only if the temporal limitation is genuine can we justify the Good-Will of the universe by appealing from the present to the future, from the beginning and the early stages of the process to its consummation.

If, however, as we have now concluded, God is compelled to work through a process, then He is a *finite* God. If God is indeed limited by time, if that which He would do at once, if He could, must be accomplished gradually, and can only be brought to fruition in the far distant future, then to affirm that He is omnipotent is, to say the least, wholly misleading.

This conclusion men have sought to escape in many ways. Perhaps the most common way, or supposed way, of escape is

to deny the authority of logic. Thus a very good friend of mine, after reading an argument very similar to that which I am presenting in this paper, wrote to me as follows: "Logic is very essential in the treatment of any subject; but the evolution of life and of history sometimes knocks our logic all to pieces. The human mind, however large its powers, and however well it has been developed and cultivated, *has its limitations*. The logical reason has its limitations, and it is unable to enter into what is called the supernatural, and to speak dogmatically in regard to the character of God, or the contents of the Supreme Being. We can reason and describe from our point of view; but only from our point of view."

I value this letter as an interesting document in the psychology of theological discussion. The attitude of which it is a typical expression is both very ancient and very modern. We find it in the pages of Dionysius, of Pascal, of Newman, of Mansel—not to mention a host of others in whom the anti-intellectualist tendency appears in greater or less degree. Such a denial of the validity of ordinary logic is, moreover, a fundamental presupposition of so-called Christian Science. And, indeed, when one is on the defensive, when one has been driven, so to speak, into a logical corner, it is very convenient to say, "This is no doubt true from the human point of view; it is valid from the standpoint of human logic. But there may be a higher point of view from which it is not true." Unfortunately, however, all theology must of necessity be written "from the human point of view." Unfortunately, too, unless we take for granted the authority of the logical reason, and agree to submit to its criterion of truth, we have no defense against any theory, however absurd or fantastic, which may challenge our acceptance. For if we employ the logical test of truth in order to demolish the theory of another, we cannot straightway renounce logic when it threatens to destroy some pet doctrine of our own.

It is, of course, impossible in the time at our disposal to attempt an adequate discussion of the anti-intellectualist posi-

tion. Let us, however, attempt to analyze it, to find out, if possible, what it means. (1) This view may be no more than a vague feeling that man's world is too big and too complex to be completely understood by the human mind. And there is, to be sure, a sense in which life is above logic. Man has other interests than the intellectual. He is not always engaged in the quest of truth. And those other aspects of human life have their rights, too. Religion, in particular, may be said to be above logic, and not to be subject to its rules; for religion normally finds expression in the language of poetry rather than in that of science. But while this is true of life in general, and of religion, it cannot be rightly said of *theology*. Life may transcend logic, and religion may transcend logic; but theology, by reason of the very nature of the quest in which it is engaged, must be logical or it is nothing. For theology is science, and not poetry. It is an *ology*, a work of *logos*. It is an attempt, not merely to give expression, as the poet or the religious person may do, to a succession of subjective moods, which may or may not be mutually consistent, but rather to formulate propositions concerning objective truth. As a system of propositions which lay claim to truth, it must at least conform to the negative test of truth, the principle of non-contradiction. In short, the theologian cannot be granted the right to utter mutually contradictory propositions about God, simply on the ground that it is about God that he is speaking.

(2) The anti-intellectualist attitude may, perhaps, be defended on the ground that there is a special organ or faculty for the apprehension of theological knowledge. Yet, even if this were to be granted, the theologian would not be rendered independent of logic. For the deliverances of this special faculty would have to be consistent *inter se*, and also with all that is valid in ordinary experience. All data of experience are candidates for membership in our system of knowledge. That which does not fit into the system we call *illusion* or *hallucination*. While only that which is, so to speak, organizable is regarded as *genuine* experience. The data of any alleged organ

of theological apprehension would then be judged by the same test employed in judging those of ordinary experience, namely, the convergence of evidence.²

(3) The anti-intellectualist position may include the claim that there is an infallible authority to which the theologian is in duty bound to conform. Thus the pious agnosticism of Pascal and Newman is confessedly merely a justification for assenting to the teachings of Mother Church, however repugnant they may be to human logic. And one may suspect that, consciously or unconsciously, this same motive is in the background in many cases where it is not explicitly acknowledged. I presume, however, that it is not necessary to devote much of our time to the claims of the infallibilists. It may, however, be remarked that assent to that which is contradictory is really impossible, since we can give assent only to that which has meaning. And, while the particular words of a self-contradictory proposition or the individual propositions of a system that is vitiated by contradiction may themselves be significant, the self-contradictory proposition or the system of mutually contradictory propositions, taken as a whole, is not merely untrue, but is in fact meaningless. For these reasons we cannot grant a right of appeal from the jurisdiction of the court of logic.

A second way, or supposed way, of escape from the conclusion that Good-Will is not omnipotent, far from depending upon a repudiation of logical impossibility, really exalts logic and builds upon it. In short, the traditional method of justifying the ways of Omnipotence to men has consisted, in principle, in an attempt—sometimes, it is true, combined, perversely enough, with a disparagement of logical reason—to avoid the necessity of recognizing any further limitation of the conception of omnipotence, by making the most of what I have called the logical limitation. From Plotinus to the present day, this has indeed been the conventional method of constructing a theodicy. The argument is, briefly, that all the

² Cf. Bode, *An Outline of Logic*, pp. 247 ff.

evils of the world, all the hard facts of human life, together constitute the condition of the possibility of the highest good, or at any rate of "goods" which are worth the price.

Sometimes the supreme good has been conceived to be the realization of a *plenum formarum*, the achievement of the greatest possible *variety* of being. This would, of course, afford a complete solution of the problem of evil; since nothing that is—as the pains of the unhappy, the sins of the wicked, or the delusions of the insane—could be dispensed with, without taking away from the perfection of the whole. This is a fundamental assumption, to take an interesting example of eighteenth century theodicy, of Pope's *Essay on Man*. In the "vast chain of being," the poet tells us, were "one step broken, the great scale's destroyed."

From Nature's chain whichever link you strike,
Tenth, or ten thousandth, breaks the chain alike.

For,

Of systems possible, if 'tis confest
That wisdom infinite must form the best,
Where all must full or not coherent be,
And all that rises, rise in due degree;
Then in the scale of reasoning life 'tis plain,
There must be, somewhere, such a rank as man:
And all the question (wrangle e'er so long)
Is only this, if God has placed him wrong?
Respecting man whatever wrong we call,
May, must be right, as relative to all.

This justification of the existence of evil has, however, two fatal defects: it would give us a merely *static* world, in which there would be no possibility of moral achievement; and its fundamental assumption runs counter to our moral perceptions, since mere variety of being as such is not good.

Another form of the general argument for the logical compatibility of Goodness and Omnipotence in a world such as ours—a view, however, which has rarely been explicitly avowed—would depend upon the assumption that the highest good is obedience to Mother Church and unquestioning assent to her teachings. You perhaps remember the Scottish rustic's ex-

planation of the presence of the fossils in the rocks—that they were put there by the Creator “to test men’s faith.” In the same way it might conceivably be maintained that all the evils of man’s world are required in order to exercise and develop his faculty of believing. Just as temptation and the example of sin are required to develop in the highest degree the ability to overcome temptation, so all the enormities and irrationalities of the world might be said to be necessary as a means of producing in the highest degree the ability to overcome the seductions of doubt and unbelief. Thus the very illogicalities of the world would be logically accounted for as means devised by Supreme Benevolence for the testing and exercise of men’s faith. Whether anyone has ever reasoned seriously in just this way, I do not know. But, granting the initial assumptions, the argument would be unanswerable. We, however, are not, it may be supposed, sufficiently enamored of unquestioning faith and implicit obedience to the voice of authority to regard these as supreme virtues, or even as virtues at all.

Usually, however, when evil is “explained” as the necessary condition of the highest good, the highest good is conceived to be some form of virtue or good will that is more attractive than unquestioning assent to authoritative teaching. It is held that courage, patience, prudence, industry, fidelity, etc., would be impossible in a world that did not include these very evils of which we complain. And, I presume, we must concede the validity of this contention. For without danger there could be no courage; without pain, no patience, etc. And the dependence is not merely contingent or adventitious. The relation, on the contrary, is one of logical implication. For by definition these virtues are abilities to resist and overcome evil. Nevertheless, while it is manifestly true that many forms of virtue would be impossible in a world which was wholly free from sin and suffering, it is far from evident that the existence of evil can be rationalized in this way. In the first place, not all evils can be included within the scope of this argument. For example, not to mention other evils which defy complete

rationalization, what shall we say of insanity, that terrible affliction so prevalent in the stress and strain of modern civilized life? How can there be moral development where the mind itself is disordered or destroyed? Or how can the delusions of the poor unfortunates whom we shut up in our asylums be supposed to contribute to the moral improvement of the rest of us, or to the achievement of the highest good of the universe? Usually, it seems to me, this logico-ethical argument for the necessity of evil—for the treachery of the traitor, and all that—as we find it in the pages of Royce and others, is helped out by an implicit assumption of the principle already discussed that *variety* of experience or of being, whether on the part of the individual subject or of the Absolute, is in itself a good. This principle, however, we are unable to grant, and, if it were granted, it would, as we have seen, lead to the practically intolerable view that the world is static, that progress is impossible.

And in the second place, the argument that sin and pain are necessary in order that there may be virtue, itself depends upon an ethical assumption which cannot be granted. It depends upon the assumption that courage, patience, and the other human qualities which have been developed as a part of man's equipment for coping with an environment which includes pain and sin, are themselves intrinsically good. On the contrary, I should maintain that these human qualities are virtues, only because they are demanded in our actual world. In a world in which there was no pain, not only would patience, for instance, be impossible; it would be unnecessary and valueless. In such a world, Good-Will would not invent pain for the sake of virtue. In a sinless world, sin would not be invented in order to make possible the virtues which consist in enduring and overcoming temptation. Of course, there is here an ultimate difference—a difference of valuations, to which attention should be called, but about which it would be idle to dispute. A special case of this conflict of ultimate ideals is the issue between militarism and pacifism, the one

finding its Heaven in struggle, and the other in enjoyment; the one approving pain, because it is the indispensable condition of courage, fidelity, etc., the other valuing these heroic human qualities, not because they are good in themselves, but because they make for success in the conflict with evil. And here we may observe a curious inconsistency on the part of a theology which would defend the omnipotence of God by maintaining the supreme value of struggle. According to such a theory of moral values, the human saint, who has overcome temptation and developed character in a life of struggle, would be ethically superior to God, who by the hypothesis, being omnipotent, could not know the meaning of struggle. If, on the contrary, we say that God enters genuinely into the experience of struggle, then this difference between the sort of goodness ascribed to God and the ideal goodness of man disappears. On this view, the virtues of struggle are good, because the struggle is real. Evil has not been permitted or invented in order to produce virtue. But evil is a consequence of genuine necessities, and the virtues are good, whether in God or man, because they limit and progressively overcome evil.

Still another form assumed by the logical argument for the necessity of evil in a world governed by Omnipotent Good-Will depends upon the conception of "free will." It is said that God limited Himself when He created free personalities. Pain and sin, on this view, are the consequences of wrong choices on the part of free agents—whether of men or of demons does not alter the argument, for the hypothesis of a Devil upon whose broad shoulders may be laid the blame for everything which cannot be the work of absolute goodness is but a special case of the free-will theodicy. God created free personalities, it is said, even at the risk of a wrong use of freedom—even, it is alleged by some, with certain foreknowledge that freedom would be misused—and this He did, because, according to those who support this view, unless conduct is freely chosen, it has no moral value.

This is not, however, a satisfactory solution of the problem

of evil. In the first place, not to mention the psychological difficulties in the notion of freedom, not all evil can be accounted for in this way. In particular, what is called "natural evil," the suffering produced by earthquakes, by volcanoes, by diseases which we have not yet learned how to prevent, by fires, and explosions, and the thousand and one accidents which happen, not through human sin, but rather through ignorance,—all these are left unexplained.

In the second place, even if all evil were caused by wrong choices of free agents, this would not absolve a Creator who is assumed to be omnipotent. For one would still have to inquire, Why did not Omnipotent Goodness create free personalities that could be trusted? Even though a will is free, it is not necessary to suppose that it will, as a matter of fact, choose wrongly. Possibility does not logically imply actuality. If, indeed, it could be shown that the conception of a sinless free will is self-contradictory, then assuming the supreme worth of free personality, God's limitation by human freedom would of course be only a variety of that which we have called the logical limitation of omnipotence. But this cannot be maintained. We cannot say that a free will which can be trusted not to sin, is a *logical* impossibility. For (1) God himself is by hypothesis such a will. He is free and He does not sin. (2) Unless a free personality which can be trusted not to sin is logically possible, moral education is not possible; since what is sought in moral education is the production of character. And good moral character has no meaning if it is not precisely this conception of a free will that can be trusted to choose rightly. It may, however, be objected that, while a free will which does not sin is logically possible, and while God could have created such a personality, or any number of such personalities, such personalities would not possess the moral worth of free wills that have become virtuous by overcoming. In other words, it may be said that a will that is created good *de novo* is not so high in the scale of value as a will that has been tempted and has overcome. But this view—even though not carried to the

point of asserting explicitly that 'Tis better to have sinned and repented than never to have sinned at all—would lead us into certain ethical entanglements. For it is, indeed, the same view which was found, a minute ago, to depend upon an untenable theory of moral values and to presuppose a radical difference between the goodness of God and that which is regarded by the theory as the ideal goodness of man.

A third way, or supposed way, of escape from the conclusion that Good-Will is not omnipotent is the rather common theory that, while God is indeed limited, the limitation is only a self-limitation. This theory has been in part anticipated in our discussion of the implications of free will. It is held that God would not have had to create free personalities if He had not desired to, but that having created them, he is now pledged to respect their freedom. In the same manner it is sometimes urged that by creating a world of natural law, He limited himself, inasmuch as He is now pledged to respect the laws of Nature which He himself has established. Thus, if this line of argument could be regarded as successful, we should have an explanation of what was spoken of above as "natural evil," and which, as was then remarked, is not accounted for by the appeal to the idea of "free will."

But, recalling what has been said about the unsatisfactory result of the appeal to free will, and even aside from what was said in that connection, I cannot regard the theory of self-limitation as a satisfactory way out. There would still be no ethical reason for the limitation. To say that the limitation is only a self-limitation is merely to juggle words. Why, indeed, should God limit himself at all, or precisely in this manner? The notion of self-limitation would seem to imply that for God the world-order is only a gigantic game. For, if by occasional changes in the order of natural events, Good-Will could preserve innocent lives and prevent unhappiness, such changes would certainly be made. If the ends for which Good-Will is striving could be accomplished at a lower cost of human pain, that is to say, in a shorter time, Good-Will would shorten the

time. If God is good, the limitation is absolute, that is to say, not of God's choosing. For, assuming God to be good, he would not have limited himself in this way, had He not been compelled to do so by some ulterior necessity; and "ulterior necessity" is only another name for a limitation that is absolute and inevitable.

Certain misunderstandings are likely to arise at this point. It may be said that this view of God is *dualism*; that it implies the Persian or Manichæan theory of the universe as the seat of a struggle between two hostile powers, Good and Evil, God and the Devil. To this we may reply (1) that merely to call a theory by a bad name does not necessarily condemn it. Suppose the theory is dualism. It may be true, nevertheless. Monism has no *a priori* claim to acceptance. And (2), while it is true that the doctrine of a finite God presupposes a pluralistic view of the world, it need not imply a dualism. At any rate, it need not imply a personification of the necessities which limit Good-Will. Just as I have insisted that our discussion does not presuppose any specific definition of God, so it should be observed that our conclusion does not require any specific definition of that which is not-God. We need not think of any Satan or Ahriman as opposing Good-Will. All that is maintained is that God is finite, that Good-Will is limited.

Again, exception may be taken to the theory of a limited God on the ground that it gives us no assurance of victory in the struggle with evil. To this objection it may be replied: (1) If the omnipotence theory, as is maintained, gives us the assurance of victory, it at the same time takes away all meaning from the idea of victory; for, if evil is a necessary condition of the good, as must be maintained by defenders of this theory, then evil must always exist by reason of the same necessity which requires it to exist now, and the notion of an eventual overcoming of evil is an illusion. (2) It is at least as easy to believe—even apart from the logical impossibility of the latter conception—in the existence of a Good-Will

which, while not infinite in power, still possesses *sufficient* power to assure the progress of the world onward and upward, as it is to believe in the omnipotence of the Good-Will. And (3) it ought, I think, to be added that the theory of a complete victory, after which there will be an endless state of satisfaction, with no more struggle, is of very doubtful value as a background for the ethical life. On the principle, I suppose, that we tend to admire that of which we feel the lack in ourselves, the ideas of Perfection and Eternity have a great fascination for the human mind. But we need also to recognize the value of the not-perfect and the worth-whileness of the transitory. For science advises us of the probability that life on our planet will sometime cease. Humanity had its beginning; it may also have its conclusion. And it may accordingly be well that we should learn to consecrate ourselves to causes which, viewed from the standpoint of eternity, are partial and temporary. At any rate, let us not, as a condition of allegiance to worthy causes, demand too much of our universe.

Whatever may be said, however, of the likelihood of an endless process toward perfection, or of a continuance of a state of perfection once it has been attained, the finitist hypothesis has the practical advantage over its rival that it gives men a field for genuine coöperation in the cosmic struggle. To be sure, even according to the rival theory, there is a struggle. But it is a factitious struggle; there is an air of unreality about it. Instead of being, so to say, an affair of real life, it is only an improving game, or a difficult problem set for us by the cosmic Schoolmaster—a problem, moreover, which need not have been set in just this way, and to which the Schoolmaster already possesses the solution. But if it be true that God enters genuinely into the experience of struggle, then all men of good will have a powerful motive for effort in the thought that, in engaging in the struggle, they are coöperating with and imitating God himself.

But if theology is really to be logical and scientific, these subjective preferences and practical advantages ought not to

determine our decision between alternative theories. Let us then place side by side the hypothesis of a God whose power is infinite (except for the logical and ethical limitations spoken of above) and that of a God whose power is limited by necessities beyond his control. Let us face the issue between those rival hypotheses objectively, in the spirit of scientific impartiality which we should expect of a physicist who is deciding between rival theories of light or of sound. What must the verdict be? I submit that the hypothesis of a God of limited power, considered now merely as a hypothesis put forth to explain the facts of experience, is more satisfactory than its rival. It conflicts with none of the facts; it harmonizes with all; while, at best, its rival accounts for only some of them.

It is, of course, hardly to be expected that in prayer and hymn and sermon we should now cease forthwith to employ the words "omnipotent" and "omnipotence" or their equivalents. But we may perhaps hope for a change in emphasis and proportion—a change, indeed, which has been under way for a long time. In our thought of God the notion of Power should be subordinated more and more, and that of Goodness should be enthroned in its stead; and the language of devotion should, of course, reflect this change of intellectual conception. Moreover, while we may continue to use the traditional language of devotion—which is poetry, and therefore must be granted a certain license in the use of terms—we must be on our guard against an obvious danger. For, while the poetical use of language does not indeed presuppose an accurate definition of words, or a clear, unambiguous meaning of phrases and sentences, the same man who in one mood is a poet, may in another mood be matter-of-fact and prosaic enough. And there is, accordingly, a constant tendency in popular thought to infer from our rhetorical, poetical, or devotional employment of the word "omnipotence" that Good-Will ought to be able to do or to prevent this or that concrete thing. And thus the train is laid, on the one hand, for the agony of rebellion against what is naturally supposed to be the divine will, or,

on the other hand, for the lethargy of fatalistic acquiescence in the continuance of evils which might, perhaps, be remedied by human effort. Side by side, therefore, with the continued employment of the traditional terminology—so far indeed as it is continued—there ought to be a clear and candid explanation of the sense in which our terms are employed. In particular, when we say that God is omnipotent, we should hasten to explain that Good-Will is not literally all-powerful, but rather possesses *great* power, which ought to be supplemented by the power of each and every individual man.

III.

COMMUNITY COÖPERATION.

J. M. MULLAN.

This is a very broad and general subject. In this discussion community coöperation will mean a method of social service. As such it is applicable to the local community, the nation, and the world. In this discussion, however, keeping in mind its broadest implications, the term will have a local meaning and will define a method of common service on the part of the people who live within restricted areas and constitute what we familiarly know as neighborhoods or communities.

Community coöperation, as defined, stands in marked contrast to the prevailing method of social service. This distinction corresponds to that which is being made to-day between community service and social service—a distinction that recognizes a cleavage between the served and the serving that has existed for some time. Social service, as popularly known, is not popular. Much social work has become discredited. This is not because there is any question as to the need for it, but to the method of its procedure, which has lacked democracy. Community coöperation, on the other hand, undertakes to apply the principles of democracy to the meeting of community needs. It proposes that the people—all the people—of a community shall get together and find out their needs as a community, and in a constructive way seek to meet them so as to promote the welfare, prosperity and happiness of the whole community which they constitute and in which they are alike essentially interested. It proceeds upon the principle that in a democracy every citizen, without respect of person, must bear his share of responsibility for the common welfare and should share likewise in the common good.

Strong, that no human soul may pass
Its warm, encircling unity,
Wide, to enclose all need, all class,
This shall we name, Community.

Service shall be that all and each,
Aroused to know the common good,
Shall strive, and in this striving reach
A broader human brotherhood.

Community Service by Sarah Collins Fernandis, in *The Survey*, February 8, 1919.

This does not mean the doing away with leadership and promotional agencies. Both are necessary. There is no doubt that the trend of the times is toward decentralization in the forms of collective life generally, but standardization, expert knowledge, specialization, are all necessary, and for these things overhead service will continue to be necessary also. Less supervision, however, more initiative and greater freedom to develop on the part of the communities themselves, with leadership of their own choosing instead of its being appointed from the top, will be increasingly characteristic of community service.

This form of service was brought to the front during the war, with the result of increased confidence in its effectiveness. The war showed that communities are capable of working together and of accomplishing with enthusiasm and satisfaction what otherwise would be at best an irksome task. This was experienced again and again in the raising of the Liberty Loans, in the war-chest drives, in the Red Cross campaigns and in other home service activities. And what is still more to the point here is the work of the War Camp Community Service, the Community Council of National Defense, and other efforts of equally definite experimental value.

The War Camp Community Service was created, and in a remarkably short time was developed, in some six hundred towns and cities throughout the country. It organized the community activities and relationships, promoted and coördinated the social agencies of each community in the spirit of

democracy and brotherhood, and in these ways sought to bring the community's best influences to bear upon the leisure life of the soldiers and sailors. This work is now being taken over by *Community Service Incorporated*. This is an organization whose particular object, according to its Constitution, "is the development in all American communities, through public and private agencies and by every appropriate means, of better moral and industrial conditions, health and welfare, play and recreation, higher and more adequate community neighborhood expression, and better social life." As an illustration of this type of community work, consider what has been done and is being done at Chester, Pa. Before the war Chester contained a population of about forty thousand. When it became a war industrial community the population suddenly leaped to double that number of polyglot elements representing some thirty nationalities besides American and colored. Into the midst of this racial mixture the War Camp Community Service sent in October, 1918, an experienced community organizer in the person of Mr. Charles Frederick Weller, Associate Secretary of the Playground and Recreation Association of America. The work was started by the appointment of a governing committee of twenty-eight, with Mr. W. C. Sproul, now Governor of Pennsylvania, as chairman, including five industrial workers, four women, the mayor, the superintendent of schools and local leaders of industry and business. To them will be added elected representatives of the departmental committees—at present ten in number, and possibly of all the committees, now numbering thirty-three, representative of every phase of community life and a goodly proportion of all local neighborhoods in the city. There is an "Advisory Council," meeting monthly for conference and mutual help, representing the social forces of the city and the churches. In inaugurating the work the first means adopted to get the people together was community singing, and this succeeded. "Community centers" were next developed in the schools. There were set up in all ten departments, including, in addition to those men-

tioned—music and community centers—departments of Americanization, Colored Organization, Italians, Hospitality,, Games, Community Clubs, Office Work and Chief Executive. The department of Americanization was launched by the forming of "Chester's League of Nations" on March 23 last, whose ceremonies were witnessed by three thousand people, while four thousand more were turned away for lack of accommodations, and were reported in six thousand newspapers. The slogan of this work is: "Put unity into community." After a few months' experience this old conservative polyglot community is responding to its own glad surprise to this appeal to the fundamental impulses of the human heart. It is authoritatively stated that groups of worth-while people, previously unregarded and unenlisted, have been discovered and coördinated; joyous, helpful community relationships have been organized by large numbers of men and women who have been surprised but glad to discover one another as public-spirited and worthy comrades. (Address by Mr. Charles Frederick Weller at the Forty-sixth National Conference of Social Workers, June, 1919.)

Community Service Incorporated will promote this sort of community coöperation, at first carrying on the work begun by the War Camp Community Service, and then extending its sphere of service throughout the country wherever it may be desired. Its outline of activities includes plays and athletics, social and recreational activities, community music, club facilities, community mass meetings and celebrations, with great variety of operations according to local conditions, needs, capacities and facilities. Representing no creed or party it will seek not to establish an institution but to develop the resources of the community itself and to render in time its own presence unnecessary. Its appeal is to all the people—not as rich or poor, native or foreigner, but as citizens. Its solicitation is not to give or accept assistance, but to work together for the community of which they are all a part, to make it a better place in which to live. (Communication from Mr. George A.

Nesbitt, of the Playground and Recreation Association of America.)

Another effort at community service in which a widespread interest has been awakened, at least among social workers, is what is known as the "Social Unit Organization," which began operations in Cincinnati in December, 1917. The social unit idea is the creation of Mr. and Mrs. Wilbur G. Phillips. It is an attempt to apply the old New England town-meeting idea to modern city government. Its purpose, as expressed in the constitution adopted by the Cincinnati organization (Article 2), is: "to hasten the coming of a democracy both genuine and efficient by building up on a basis of geographical units an organization through which the people can get a clear idea of their common needs and can utilize the technical skill of the occupational groups in formulating and carrying out programs to meet those needs." This it seeks to do by selecting limited geographical areas and effecting an organization that will make one hundred per cent. contact with the people within the district in order to help them to become conscious of their common needs and how they may solve those needs; and to secure their coöperation with the local and outside specialists in solving those needs. When Mr. and Mrs. Phillips appealed for an opportunity to try out the social unit plan sixteen cities replied favorably with invitations. Cincinnati was selected, and what is known as the Mohawk-Brighton section was decided upon for the experiment. This is a typical section of thirty-one blocks, with a population of about fifteen thousand, ninety per cent. American, half and half Protestant and Catholic, whose average incomes per year, at the time of the organization, were from eight hundred to one thousand dollars. The immigrants are chiefly of the Slavic races. A large percentage of the American population is of German extraction. The district is divided into block units, each block having a resident worker who is one of the people. These block workers are supposed to become acquainted with all the people of their respective blocks, eventually to have personal knowledge of all

the social conditions within their districts, and are to serve as messengers between the organization and the people. This is the operation of the organization from the bottom. Working from the top of the social structure in the several districts the various specialists and technicians have been organized in order that their skill may be made to serve the needs of the people as these are discovered and the people desire their service. It is a part of the scheme to organize all the specialists of the city for the service of the district specialists and workers. There are three things in this plan that are a distinct departure from old-time methods of organization and administration—block workers from the neighborhood instead of professional workers, district specialists instead of specialists with large reputations, and the application of the self-governing principle instead of the authoritative principle. As to the last named element, nothing is supposed to be undertaken without the actual consent of the representatives of the residents of the district wherein action is proposed. The report of William J. Norton, who investigated this work under the Helen S. Trownstine Foundation of Cincinnati, says that at the time of his investigation (February 1, 1919) a very excellent beginning had been made toward putting into effect these features of the program. The first service to be undertaken was the health service and the care of infants received first consideration. This, too, at the time of the investigation referred to, was well under way. Up to the time of the launching of the program it had taken about a year to complete the organization. These results have recently been reported: Nursing and medical care had been extended to all infants; tuberculosis nursing had increased 400 per cent.; bedside nursing had increased 500 per cent.; medical supervision and prenatal care had been extended to forty per cent. of all expectant mothers where no care had been given before; the death rate from influenza had been cut in two during the epidemic; ninety per cent. of all pre-school children had been examined. The Social Unit machinery had been utilized for other things also—lecture courses in citizen-

ship, recreation, war gardens, Liberty Bonds sales, War Chest campaigns; and a referendum had been conducted on the question: "Shall Mohawk-Brighton continue the Social Unit?" This referendum had been called forth by the astounding assertion of the Mayor of Cincinnati that the Social Unit was Bolshevikistic, with the result that the question was answered by an overwhelming "YES"—4,034 affirmative votes against 120 negative ones. The investigation mentioned did not find anything in the experiment that can be called socialistic, though states that it is a distinct departure from old time methods of organization and administration. The experimental period is three years. Reports indicate satisfaction with the experiment on the part of the people and a growing community spirit among them. (Studies from the Helen S. Trounstone Foundation, February 1, 1919. *World Outlook*, July, 1919. *New Republic*, April 19, 1919: "Who Makes Bolshevism in Cincinnati?" Courtenay Dinwiddie: "The Work Accomplished by the Social Unit Organization," in the Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Workers, 1918.)

Mention may also be made in this connection of a movement for community organization, upon a more comprehensive scale, that seeks especially to benefit the rural sections. There has been some recognition of the need for rural organization for a long time in a more or less academic way. The war, however, brought the realization of this need in a practical way to many, and there are several departments of the national government interested in it—notably the War Department, through the Council of National Defense. During the brief period of the war this became nation-wide. Every state created its defense organization, and nearly every state created county organizations. Before the armistice had been signed, it was authoritatively stated that forty-one states had formerly embarked on community council work. This form of organization was particularly popular in the West.

Underlying the organization of the *Community Council of National Defense* was not merely the purpose to win the war,

but the realization of the urgent need of placing back upon the people responsibility for the welfare of the nation and of awakening within them a sense of their personal obligations in this matter. President Wilson said some years ago that liberty as now expressed in this country is unsatisfactory, because there has not been a satisfactory adjustment of the parts of the community. It would now seem to have been his idea that in fighting to make the world safe for democracy we should commit ourselves to ways and methods which would at the same time mean the making of democracy for ourselves more satisfactory than it had been before the war. He was a strong advocate of the Community Council of National Defense, and Mr. John Collier says that the plan to win the war through democracy involved the plan of this organization and involved manifold *permanent* adjustments in the direction of constructive citizenship. It appears now to have been the idea of the promoters of this movement that these councils should become the means, through the crisis of the war, for the restoration of power and responsibility to the local community for the welfare of the nation.

With this in mind it is significant that under date of January 15, 1919, a communication from headquarters was addressed to the County and Community Councils of Defense and the Units of the Woman's Committee saying: "In addition to all emergency work, a continuing service lies before the community councils. They have brought out of the war a new unity and sense of coöperative fellowship. One of the lessons which we have learned in the strain of war is the interdependency of social effort. It is now, therefore, the duty and opportunity of the community councils to make the new unity a permanent asset in the national life, to the end of *leavening the entire Nation with the spirit of coöperative and communal endeavor.*" This communication is headed, "Community council work during the period of *demobilization and readjustment* and the permanent organization of communities." It goes on to say that when the emergency programs

are things of the past the need for the organization of each community will endure; and then proceeds to outline programs of work and organization, including Health and Sanitation, Americanization, Education, coöperative enterprises such as marketing, canning and kitchens, beautifying the community, providing recreational facilities and occasions, etc. (Community Council Circular No. 4.)

The Community Council of National Defense is in no particular essentially different from the Community Center Movement, which was begun and fostered by the Bureau of Education under the Department of the Interior of the National Government before the war began, and which has been coöperating with the Council of National Defense. The slogan of the Council of National Defense has been: "Every school district a community council for national service." The slogan of the Community Center Movement has been: "Every schoolhouse a community capitol and every community a little democracy." ("A Community Center," Bulletin, 1918, No. 11, by Henry E. Jackson.) Both of these movements have the very hearty endorsement of President Wilson. The Recreational Department of the Russell Sage Foundation also is promoting the community school center movement. (Clarence Arthur Perry's "First Steps in Community Center Development," and "Community Center Activities.")

There are other organizations and agencies more or less representative that indicate the trend of the times, such as the neighborhood association, the settlement movement, and the Playground and Recreation Movement. Community coöperation is a fact—not merely a theory, with much, however, to be done in the way of coördination, and much experimentation going on.

We have defined community coöperation as a method of procedure, as a means to an end. It is an attempt to find an inclusive form of organization to meet our common needs. The tendency to start organizations has been a marked characteristic of our times and country. It has been observed that if

but five persons come together to do anything they first draw up a constitution. Early last year it was reported that over *eighty separate organizations existed for the purpose of supplying some kind of war relief*. A tremendous amount of energy has gone into the maintenance of organizations that might have been more profitably spent in behalf of the common good. Community coöperation is the solution of this problem. It is not a rival of existing organizations: it embraces all of them. Lines of Edward Markham well express the idea of community coöperation:

He drew a circle which shut me out,
Heretic, rebel, a thing to flout;
But Love and I had the wit to win,
We drew a circle that took him in.

These lines also express the *spirit* of community coöperation, and it will operate to bring about unity amidst complexity of organization, by what we know in religion as the expulsive power of a great affection. This is love of country, and the desire to meet our nation's urgent need. President Wilson has said our greatest need as a nation is "to arouse and inform the people so that each individual may be able to play his part intelligently in our great struggle for democracy and justice." This is the heart and soul of community coöperation.

We are face to face with a great common task. However varied our activities, but one thing is needful. There are emergency problems, growing out of the war, that call for emergency expedients, but the war has left us with the fundamental problem of *democracy*. Superficial reforms and palliative measures will no longer satisfy the social conscience of the nation. The social ideals that made the war, with its appalling sacrifices, seem worth while to Americans, have assumed the place of supreme importance in their minds. The welfare of the collective life of the people has cost millions of lives and has thereby become of paramount concern over the private and personal interests of any individual or any group of individuals. Underneath the great war was the mighty

upward surge of the struggling classes seeking justice and fullness of life. We have reached a danger point in our national life. Conditions are serious, though not yet menacing. They are not yet ripe for Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, and they must not ripen into these. Nor need they "if progress toward justice is permitted to work its naturally slow course, through discussion and agitation unhindered by artificial obstructions." We should secure social justice in a democracy like ours by orderly procedure. This is what community coöperation will accomplish. If the war has taught us anything, it has taught us the utter folly of separation and competition, and that our salvation depends upon effective coöperation. Here lies not only our way of escape but also our path toward the heights which we aspire to reach. It is said that once upon a time Socrates was asked, "How shall we get to Mt. Olympus?" and that to this question he wisely replied, "By doing all your walking in that direction." Community coöperation will not bring about the millennium in a day, neither will it solve our problems as by a stroke of magic, but by community coöperation we shall be doing all our walking in the right direction, and the people will have patience to endure unto the end.

Some years ago, as I recall, Dr. Lyman Abbott said that if democracy should fail the remedy would be more democracy. Democracy has not failed, but we realize that the time has come when we must have more democracy or we shall have less of it. "Unless this country is made a good place for all of us to live in, it won't be a good place for any of us to live in." We have come to realize that, and we believe the place for us to begin to make our country a place good enough for all of us to live in is the local community or neighborhood, for, however different communities may be, in their fundamental needs they are one. Community aims have been classified as follows: health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, righteousness. These aims indicate our common tasks.

We must abolish disease and democratize health. We

must see to it that children born into the world are well born and into conditions that will make normal, wholesome lives possible.

We must abolish poverty and democratize wealth. We have learned the secret of protection. We have found the "open sesame" to the natural resources of the country and the world. We must now solve the problem of distribution. The belief of the working people that the employing class benefits disproportionately must be dissipated by a system of industry that will make this suspicion impossible. Sops in the form of increased wages or bonuses, or the installation of welfare work will not avail. Nothing will avail but justice that will stand the test of inclusiveness—that will be just to all and will see to it that brain and brawn will each receive the value of work done.

We must abolish class distinctions and democratize friendship. This has well been characterized as about the biggest and finest work in the world—to know human beings just as they are and to make them acquainted with one another just as they are. Says the same authority: "Why, it is the foundation of all the democracy there is or ever will be. Sometimes I think that friendliness is the only achievement of life worth while, and unfriendliness the only tragedy." It will prove to be an effectual solvent of some of our troubles. There is involved in this community aim the whole program of play. It was this phase of our war-time service that crushed caste and brought about for the time being a great comradeship of service. It stripped men of their marks of distinction and brought them face to face, and enabled them to see eye to eye, as folks and neighbors. It will prove a saving element now.

We must abolish ignorance, and democratize knowledge upon a basis of a common understanding of our needs. Through a reorganization and extension of our educational system the best training must be made available to the capable youths of our land in the humblest circumstances.

We must democratize beauty. The time has come when the

people are realizing that we may think in terms of beauty, that nothing can be too beautiful for us, and that instead of beauty's being a luxury for those who can afford it, it is our common birthright.

We are going to abolish evil and democratize righteousness. We are getting a new appreciation of the ancient prophecies that holiness is to become a common household possession, and righteousness is to cover the earth as the waters cover the deep.

We have come to believe that all these things may be ours if we will but get together and claim them, and that their common achievement by all of us working together will be worth whatever sacrifice may be required.

What should be the Church's function in community coöperation? Much is being said about the Church's responsibility for the social welfare. The task of the Church is being emphasized to-day as threefold, which requires, in addition to the customary provisions for public worship and religious education, that also for social service. No doubt this emphasis is a wholesome sign of the social awakening of the Church. To what extent, however, churches should engage in the doing of welfare work is up for discussion. There is great danger that the old mistake of duplication of plants and waste of resources will be repeated in this new phase of the work, and that churches, without fully realizing what they are doing, will use this as a means of promoting denominational ends in the communities where they carry on. This would be a great misfortune.

Without doubt, however, there are communities whose social needs may best be served through some denominational responsibility, such as those in which but one church exists, or those in which there are denominational allocations, and church federations with successful community programs. It is a question, however, whether these are not the exception rather than the rule. Is not the important task of the Church in this matter to-day that of promoting and advancing the method of community coöperation instead of undertaking to render this

community service itself? In this connection attention may be called to what the Commission on the Church and Social Service of the Federal Council has said in its most recent publication, "Message for Labor Sunday, 1919": "We advise church people and pastors to take sympathetic interest in the community center movement in their own community, to assist in its development, to keep it out of the control of politicians, and under the control of public-spirited citizens, and to avoid duplication of buildings and effort."

The Church is well qualified to advance the work of community coöperation. It is as universal as are the community groupings of the people. Moreover, it is the proper function of the Church to interpret communities to themselves, to interpret to all of them the ideals of democracy, and to stand for coöperation among the people. It is properly the Church's function to give to a community the ideal of what it should be, as a vital part of the Kingdom of God, and to create the spirit and the self-sacrifice necessary for its realization, without which our common community tasks will not be achieved.

Moreover, are we not beginning to perceive anew that the fundamental function of the Church will continue to be what it has always been, namely, the production of the type of individual necessary to the construction and maintenance of the social order we are seeking to produce?

There is a piece of statuary by Frank F. Stone, a picture of which and a reference to which may be seen in the community center bulletin already mentioned. It is entitled "The Two Ambitions." There are three figures represented in this piece of art. On the right is the figure of a successful man. He holds in his hands a crown, miter, money bags and sword, and over his shoulder hangs an ermine robe. These are the trophies of his achievements. His face wears an expression of self-satisfaction, and superiority over his fellow-man. He holds his place of preëminence by divine right. Opposite him is another figure of a different type. He is represented as in the act of scaling the heights of human achievements, but he is not

willing to rise alone. With his eyes fixed on the heights before him, he reaches a hand to a weaker brother that they may rise together. There is in this piece of art a contrast of types that are true to life. The achievements of democracy are dependent upon the latter type of man here represented in striking contrast. The production of this type of manhood and womanhood is the supreme task of the Church, and in the immediate future the capacity of the Church will be taxed to the utmost in this great service. President Wilson some time since said to a prominent business man: "I am not so much concerned as to whether we shall have good business after the war. The thing that concerns me most is whether or not the American people will be able to stand that great prosperity which is in store for them." This great prosperity may be delayed or hastened, but that it is coming hardly any one doubts. This ought to be of great concern to the Church, and if the democratic ideals struggling for expression to-day are to be realized and in their realization the welfare of society permanently advanced, the Church must strengthen itself not only to promote the same, but, which is far more important, to provide the fundamental requirement without which this work cannot be done or if done will not endure, that is, the socialized individual, with that mind in him which was in Christ Jesus who came into this world not to be served but to serve, and who gave his life in that great service.

Is the Church ready for this two-fold task? Are the churches as organized to-day adequate to meet these needs? The prerequisite of the churches' success in this undertaking is their getting together themselves upon a basis of hearty coöperation. The competition of religious groups has become a most serious handicap to the progress of community life which they ought to be inspiring and directing. This is particularly true in the rural sections, but it is also true in our cities where denominationalism is probably the one greatest obstacle to the development of a genuine community consciousness and community coöperation. The churches must either get together to-day or

stand discredited by the gospel which they preach. Brotherhood is the dominant thought of Jesus, and of this great civilizing idea the Church has been the proponent. Beneath all their sectarian differences this alone is the tie that binds them to Christ. The churches to-day are face to face, not as some say, with their failure, but with their success. Brotherhood—the substance of the common gospel of the churches—is triumphing. The churches must either adjust themselves to the demands of their own gospel by coming together upon the gospel basis of coöperation or see the fruits of their sowing gathered by others. They cannot go on preaching a gospel which they themselves decline to practice.

This does not mean organic union of the churches. It means such coöperative administration as will enable the churches to function as a unit with the utmost effectiveness in behalf of the individual and of the collective life of the communities throughout the land and of the world. The "local churches can never constitute a powerful social force until they are effectively federated and intelligently related to the social movement of their community. The next ten years should see the Protestant churches working unitedly in every community, the Catholic, Hebrew and Protestant churches coöperating in social effort. Here is one field in which theological and historical differences need not figure, in which religion may become a uniting, and not, as too often at present, a divisive force." (Pamphlet of the Commission on the Church and Social Service, "Message for Labor Sunday," 1919.)

This is a difficult task. It has been said, and truthfully, that it is more difficult—but also more meritorious—to wean men of their prejudices than it is to civilize the barbarians. But we must face the alternative of this proposition. What is going to happen if we do not come together? This is the Church's judgment day. Everything is up for review in the Church, and it has been well put that "Maximum Service is Judge and All the People Jury." Either we must come together upon a basis of effective service in behalf of the common

cause or remain apart from the forces that will recreate the world of to-morrow. In the last analysis the Church will have met the test of devotion to our Lord and Master most truly when it has succeeded in serving the common interests of the people by the method which best expresses the spirit of the gospel proclaimed. And when it has done this it will experience the truth of what someone has said: "The Church can have the people any time it wants them, but to want them is a spiritual achievement of a very high order."

The churches at this time are planning for tremendous tasks. It has been reported that when a deputation from the British Labor Party visited Lloyd George and presented demands that seemed very bold, he replied: "I am not afraid of the audacity of these demands. Don't be thinking of getting back to where you were before the war. I believe the settlement after the war will succeed in proportion to its audacity. If I were adviser to the working class I should say to them, 'Audacity is the thing for you.'" The churches are making great demands to-day—or are preparing to make them. There need be no fear of the audacity of these demands. The thing to fear is that there will not be a spirit of sacrifice on the part of the churches sufficient to efface themselves in the promotion of the welfare of the people and the advancement of the Kingdom of God. If the forward movement in the churches means the entrenchment of denominationalism and the bolstering up of an order that is passing away we are but postponing the evil day and creating a "last state" worse than the first. The profoundest lesson of the war should not escape us. Whatever the immediate cause or the occasion of the war, deep beneath and through all lay the competitive system of nationalism. The competitive system of denominationalism is its counterpart in the realm of religion and the Church. Sacrifice is the law of like and sooner or later it is seen that progress demands it. The Church cannot escape the demand of its own gospel.

In Thomas Tiplady's book, "The Cross at the Front," there is a chapter with the significant title, "The Untouched Cross."

It is the story of a "deserted village" from which all the inhabitants have fled, and desolation all about it. In the midst of this scene of destruction there were the remains of an old church that had withstood the storms of nature and the ravages of war for three centuries, now in ruins. The writer came upon this place. He had walked through parts of the ruined church and was looking at the débris when of a sudden an object caught his sight that startled him. A large wooden cross fastened against the wall and bearing nailed upon it a life figure of the Savior! It stood intact—the one thing in the church undamaged and untouched, symbol of the undying Love which may be disregarded and unheeded, denied and resisted, but which can never be dethroned. Amidst the wreck of empires and the crash of civilizations the Cross of Christ stands forth as the only solvent of our troubles and the only hope of our salvation. Will the Church take up this Cross to-day and go forth in its spirit to rebuild civilization around it? It is to this service that community coöperation challenges the Church.

BALTIMORE, Md.

IV.

SUGGESTIONS OF THE PEACE TREATY OF WESTPHALIA FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

ARTHUR MACDONALD.

The League of Nations, that has been inaugurated around the peace table in France, is doubtless the most important of any in history. One reason is the fact that whatever plan the League decides to carry out will necessarily concern most all countries of the world. For railroads, steamships, aëroplanes, telegraph, telephones and wireless telegraphy, as never before, have made communication between nations so easy, quick and direct that distance is almost eliminated, enabling the world to think, reason and act at the same time, and to be influenced as one human solidarity.

There seems to be a strong desire in all lands that the League of Nations will make future wars not only improbable, but practically impossible. But how can this be done? For years countless peace plans and theories have been proposed, filling volumes of books, but they are mainly of a speculative nature. Since theoretical grounds have proved inadequate, is there, then, any experience in the history of the world which can be made a basis for permanent peace? Is there, for instance, any kind of war that has resulted in doing away with itself permanently? The answer is that the Thirty Years' War, closing with the Peace of Westphalia (1648), seems to have put an end to all religious wars.

How, then, does it happen that the Peace Treaty of Westphalia, of all the treaties of the world, is the only one that has stopped religious wars? It certainly is a phenomenal¹ fact

¹ The writer has been unable to find any discussion of this phase of the matter.

in history. It would seem, therefore, of interest and importance, especially at the present time, to make a short anthropological study of the Thirty Years' War, which resulted in such an exceptional and successful treaty.

NEW FIELD FOR ANTHROPOLOGY.

From the anthropological point of view, history can be looked upon as a laboratory for the purpose of the study of humanity with a view of understanding it better and assisting in its progress.

In the past, anthropology has concerned itself mainly with savage and prehistoric man, but it is due time that it take up the more important and much more difficult subject of civilized man, not only as an individual, but as an organization² or nation, or group of nations. It is true that other departments of knowledge, like history and politics, have pursued these fields, but unfortunately not always in the scientific sense. To use an ancient pun, it is *his*-story, rather than all the facts. Anthropology in this new field should seek to establish only those truths which can be based upon facts. There are doubtless many very important truths which cannot be established by scientific methods, but they perhaps can be better treated in psychology, politics, ethics, philosophy and theology.

In the present inquiry the anthropological problem is this: As religious wars are admitted to be the most intense, most idealistic and most sacrificial of all wars, and, therefore, most difficult to stop, can it be ascertained just how the Thirty Years' War, culminating in the Peace of Westphalia, brought about the end of all religious wars? This might suggest how all political wars may be made to cease. If the seventeenth century accomplished the more difficult task, the League of Nations ought to succeed in the less difficult one. If the

² See a study of the United States Senate, by the writer (published in Spanish), under the title of "Estudio del Senado de los Estados Unidos de America," in *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas*. 21 de Enero de 1918. Buenos Aires, 1918.

twentieth century prides itself on being superior in diplomacy, practical statesmanship and general mental caliber, it will now have an opportunity to show such superiority, by formulating a treaty which will make all future political wars not only improbable, but impossible.

PRINCIPLES OF A PEACE CONFERENCE.

In following the present Peace Conference, and comparing it with the Peace Congress of Westphalia, it may be well to mention a few of the principles of such Congresses in general. In a treaty of peace there are the usual articles, as declaration that peace is restored, and amnesty clauses, including restitution of such conquests as are not intended to be retained and of rights suspended by the war. Also there are provisions to remove the causes out of which the war arose, redress grievances and prevent their occurrence. This is the most essential thing for the Congress to do. Then there is the indemnity for satisfactory restoration for injury sustained and cost of war. But there should be great prudence here, otherwise the conquered power may feel deep resentment, which is liable to sow seeds for a future war.

As to personal attendance at the Congress, one great advantage is that difficulties thought insurmountable in correspondence often disappear in an interview. Half the work is done when members have come to know what each really wants.

But in long discussions there is danger of becoming fatigued and making ill-advised concessions. There is also temptation for some members to interfere, where they have no substantial interests nor rights, and to contract engagements in which they have no special concern. When strong enough, every nation will insist on the right to manage its own internal affairs. Sometimes there are a few particularly able men, fluent in several languages (a very practical advantage), but representing small countries, who may exercise undue influence, and cause the Congress to authorize things which may not prove of equal justice to all. Members of Congresses have been known to

vote for things that they did not understand, to the great disadvantage of their own country, due mainly to inexperience and lack of familiarity with the language spoken in the Congress.

THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA.

As early as 1636 Pope Urban the Sixth extorted from the belligerents of the Thirty Years' War their unwilling consent to treat. In 1637 a discussion of safe conducts lasted nearly five years, and it was not until 1641 that preliminaries as to time and place of the Congress were signed, and these were not ratified, nor safe conducts exchanged until 1643, making six years for controversies as to mere formalities. One of the causes of this dilatoriness was that neither side really desired peace. Captiousness, peevishness and punctiliousness were doubtless emphasized in order to obtain delay.

The labor of concluding the peace of Westphalia was called colossal; there were endless obstacles to surmount, contending interests to reconcile, a labyrinth of circumstances to coöperate with, besetting difficulties at the very opening of negotiations of arranging the conditions of peace and still more the carrying them through the proceedings. These were some of the practical problems that were encountered.

It is, therefore, fair to assume that the difficulties in establishing the Peace of Westphalia were as great and probably greater than those now confronting the Peace Conference in France. For in the Westphalian Congress they did not desire peace and it was not possible to agree to an armistice, so that war continued while the Congress was in session, materially affecting their deliberations; this may be one reason why the Congress lasted as long as four years.

To avoid questions of precedence, and to lessen further opportunities for disagreement, two cities in Westphalia, Münster for the Catholics and Osnabruck for the Protestants, were selected. These places were a short day's ride apart. The treaty was signed at Münster October 24, 1648, and was called

"The Peace of Westphalia." In addition to the disposition for delay, there was a tendency to criticize things generally. Thus certain plenipotentiaries complained of their accommodations, saying that the houses, though high and handsome externally, were in fact rat holes. The streets also were pronounced very narrow, so much so that a certain very polite diplomat, who wore a very large hat, when making from his coach an extremely low bow, his hat hit a very expensive vase in an open window, which fell and broke, causing great embarrassment.

First, questions of etiquette were taken up. For instance, did the precedence belong to Spain, and what marks of honor were due to the representatives of the neutral powers?

Then came contests for ecclesiastical seats. The Nuncio, the representative of the Pope, wished to sit not only at the head of the table, but wanted a canopy over him to distinguish him. The way in which the minor powers should be received was in doubt. It was finally decided to go half way down the stairs with guests when departing; also the question of titles arose. The word "Excellency" was chosen for addressing the envoys of the great powers, but it had to be extended to lesser powers. The Venetian envoy obtained the honor (to his joy) of being conducted, when he visited the French, to the door of his coach, instead of to the staircase. These few of the many incidents during the Congress will illustrate the human side of official matters. Such disputes as to precedence and etiquette were to be expected in a proud and ceremonious age among representatives of numerous States, especially when many of them were of doubtful rank. There was also much display. A train of eighteen coaches conveyed the French envoys in their visits of ceremony. It appeared that France desired to show that she had not been impoverished by the war, like Germany.

The Papal Nuncio and Venetian envoy were mediators as well as members of the Congress. France and Sweden were opposed to each other in religion, but in accord on political

policies. The treaty was drawn up with such fullness and precision of language as is rarely found in documents of this nature, due to a large body of trained lawyers among the members. As indicating a desire for fairness in little things, as well as the larger questions, the treaty contained these words: "No one of any party shall look askance at any one on account of his creed." As an example of wise provisions, the following may be noted: The Protestants demanded the year 1618 for restitution; the Catholics insisted on 1630. The Congress split the difference and made it 1624. The *medius terminus* is often the wisest course in acute controversies.

As to temporal affairs, all hostilities, of whatever kind, were to be forgotten and neither party was to molest nor injure the other for any purpose. In regard to spiritual affairs, complete equality was to exist (*acqualita exacta mutuaque*), and every kind of violence was forever forbidden between the parties.

The Peace of Westphalia was the first effort to reconstruct European States' system, and it became the common law of Europe. Few treaties have had such influence, and Europe is said for the first time to have formed a kind of commonwealth, which watched with anxiety over the preservation of the general peace.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

To have called to mind some of the principal points in the Peace of Westphalia is not sufficient for understanding the real significance of the treaty without some consideration of the Thirty Years' War. As already suggested, this war, looked at from a scientific point of view, is an unconscious experiment of nations, a problem in abnormal international psychology. In order to comprehend this experiment and its resultant treaty, just how it brought about permanent religious peace, some of the main events of the war must be recalled, as a basis upon which to work.

The Protestant Reformation had great influence upon almost everything political in Europe until the Peace of West-

phalia. The religious peace of Augsburg (1555) furnished no settlement to questions stirred up by the Reformation. The Thirty Years' War marked the end of the Reformation, which changed the idea of Christian unity, altered the theory of a Holy Roman Empire, replacing it by the idea of autonomy for individual States. It was inevitable that such fundamental disagreements of the sixteenth century should lead to a general war.

On May 23, 1618, a body of Protestants entered the royal palace at Prague and threw two detested representatives of the Crown from the window. This act started a struggle that involved Europe thirty years in war, which spread gradually from Bohemia over South Germany, then slowly to Northern Germany and Denmark, until country after country began to take part, when the struggle became general. The war might have ended in 1623, making is a thirteen years' war, but for the outrageous treatment of the Protestant States of North Germany, resulting in political disintegration, in which Germany lost half of her population and two thirds of her wealth. Her religion and morality sank low, and the intellectual damage required generations to restore.

The Roman Catholic Church, having enjoyed for centuries the unity of Christianity, naturally felt greatly wronged by Protestants' secession. This explains the absolute enmities of the Thirty Years' War. Different parties claimed the control of the religious doctrines and worship of the people; they were fighting between themselves for this power, for which they were ready to sacrifice their lives. The Lutherans were as intolerant toward the Calvinists as they were towards the Catholics. The Catholic Church, convinced of the absolute truth of its doctrines, based upon thirteen centuries of growth, naturally had feelings of pride. To have some young reformers arise and challenge the Divine rights of the Church could not but arouse and incense them, and especially since such reformers seized old monastic foundations with landed domains and edifices and administered them in the interest of revolu-

tion. The resistance of the Catholic Hierarchy, to the last drop of blood, was a normal reaction. As so often happens, the conditions are abnormal, not the human beings. Protestants as well as Catholics gladly died for their beliefs. Indeed, at one time religious enthusiasm was so intense that the Church had to forbid martyrs rushing to the stake to be burned. It was believed that they went directly to Heaven.

One of the leaders in the first part of the war was Ferdinand II, who said he would rather beg or be cut to pieces than submit to heresy. When he conquered the Protestants, he considered their persons, property and opinions at his disposal. All his subjects must become Catholics or leave his dominions. Ferdinand was aided in this bloody work by Maximilian of Bavaria. They are accused of going so far as to entice men to remain in their dominions for the executioner's ax. Maximilian, acting for Ferdinand, had promised the people that their lives at least would be spared. This promise, however, was an obstacle in carrying out their plans. As a Christian, Ferdinand must be merciful, so he resorts to the Church for counsel and comfort. But he allows the penalties to be executed in their full severity; he lessens their rigor in a few cases. Thus Count Schlick was to have his right hand cut off and then to have been quartered alive. Ferdinand decides that the Count shall first be beheaded, and then have his right hand cut off.

Had the war stopped in 1623, the Catholics would have been left with decided advantages; the ambition of Maximilian, however, prevented it. But Gustave Adolphus appeared, and by his efforts Protestantism is said to have been saved from extinction. As there was little of it left on the continent, he saw that he must either attack or eventually defend. He took the offensive; circumstances favored him, there being a rivalry among leaders of the Catholics. During thirteen of the thirty years the lands of the Protestants had been devastated; during the next seventeen years came equalization of the exhaustion of the parties before a lasting religious peace was made. It

became clear that neither Catholics nor Protestants could crush each other without both perishing.

TERRIBLE RESULTS OF THE WAR.

In the Thirty Years' War its terrible results may be summed up by saying that Germany was the carcass and the hosts which invaded the German soil were the vultures. The Protestant invaders were Swedes, Finns, Hollanders, Frenchmen, Englishmen and Scotchmen; the Catholic intruders were Spaniards, Italians, Walloons, Poles, Cossacks, Croats, and representatives of nearly all Slavonic tribes. There was an army of 40,000, but the camp followers were 140,000, consisting of gangs of gypsies, Jewish traders, marauders and plunderers. The soldiers robbed and tortured all alike, both friend and foe. The inhabitants would flee to the woods, taking or hiding everything they could. But the invaders were experts, pouring water everywhere on the ground; for where it sank quickly there they knew something had been recently buried. All watched for stragglers, for the sick and wounded, who had dropped behind, putting them to death with every device of cruelty and insult known. Much of the cruelty is too hideous to mention. In many districts the desolation was so great that persons were found dead with grass in their mouths. Men climbed up the scaffolds and tore down the bodies of those hanged and devoured them. The supply was large. Newly buried corpses were dug up for food. Children were enticed away, that they might be slain and eaten. The population, when plundered, would turn and become plunderers, forming into bands, and inflict on others the horrors that they themselves had suffered. Men became wholly indifferent to the sufferings of others. Whole countries were destroyed, villages reduced to ashes, and civilization was pushed back into barbarism for half a century. The Thirty Years' War was said to have been so unspeakably cruel and calamitous that the like has never been known in Europe.

CAUSES OF THE LENGTH OF THE WAR.

Gustavus Adolphus said in a letter that the war would be long drawn out and stop from exhaustion. The original purpose of the war was the suppression of the Protestant faith, but the victories of Gustavus Adolphus had made the Catholics hopeless. Also other interests had risen up and there were other combatants; the war had passed from a German to a European question. Though there were times when peace might have been made, the side who had the best of it for the moment deemed it folly to stop when victory was in reach. The other side thought it base and cowardly not to continue, as some turn of fortune might repair the losses. Many a war has dragged on, after the purpose with which it began was unattainable, because those who commenced it were too vain to admit that the objects of the war were impossible from its outset.

In a long war also individuals rise up to whom fighting becomes a second nature, who know nothing else but violence and murder. Thus many soldiers were indignant when the Westphalian Peace was signed, for they felt they had a vested right to plunder and murder, looking upon a wretched, helpless population as their just prey.

A further reason for the long continuation of the war was the very exhaustion of both sides; there was not enough strength on either side to strike a decisive blow, nor sufficient energy left to make a vigorous effort for peace, causing it to seem useless to try. In the earlier and middle period of the war there were many cries for peace, but in the last eight years of the war there was a terrible silence of death and such utter desperation that it was hard even to speak, so great was the exhaustion. The soldiers decreased as it became more and more difficult to recruit and feed them; the military operations grew feebler and desultory, the fighting more inconclusive, though the misery did not diminish. But, while the people and soldiers had become tired of the interminable struggle and wanted peace, many of the diplomats did not appear to desire it.

CAUSES OF THE WAR.

The great length of the war gradually revealed its hopelessness and uselessness, creating a general desire for rest and peace, transforming and weakening the religious movements, out of which the war arose. The principle of private judgment, coming from the Reformation, had had time to develop and undermine the ideas of temporal rights and duties, common to both parties, and many ideas impressed by the Reformation, but suppressed at the time, had at last been reached, through the long-continued tribulations and had commenced to grow.

Another cause of the war was the inherent incompatibility of religious views among the people. Religious discord exists to-day, but it is not decided by bloody conflicts, because of breath of religious insight, general indifference, and increasing skepticism. The convictions of the people of the seventeenth century, as to the truth of their own opinions and as to the errors of their opponents, were of such an absolute character that they cannot be found to-day, even among people with the most rigid beliefs. They did not know that it was possible to live together and yet have the most varied and contradictory religious convictions. To suppose that these people were stupid is an error. The chances are that they were less stupid than people are to-day. How many, at the present time, can look at their country, its ideals, ideas and customs justly and without prejudice? Naturally very few. But to place ourselves outside of not only our country, but our generation, is much more difficult. How could we expect, then, the people of the seventeenth century to do this?

IGNORANCE, THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

The fundamental cause that brought the Thirty Years' War to a close was *mental insight* into the uselessness and hopelessness of further struggle, caused by the feeling of exhaustion, due to the long continuance of the war. The reason why this

war put an end to all religious wars was that this intellectual insight became general in Europe, inculcating more liberal religious views. This psychological attitude, with increasing indifference to religion and resultant skepticism, caused religious questions to be regarded less seriously, making further wars for such purposes impossible. The basal reason, therefore, was the intellectual realization of the foolishness of bloodshed on account of difference of religious convictions; that is, lack of knowledge of this fact in the past; in short, *ignorance* was at the bottom of it all, as of most evils in the world.

COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR AND THE EUROPEAN WAR.

In order to learn what suggestions from the Thirty Years' War may be of use for the League of Nations, it will be well to mention the general similarities and differences between this war and the present European war. The similarities are as follows:

1. The Thirty Years' War began with the throwing out of a window (defenestration) detested persons; the European war started from an assassination.
2. The Thirty Years' War had been expected for some time; a general European war had been predicted for many years.
3. The Thirty Years' War began with a local incident and spread from country to country, just like the European war did.
4. The Thirty Years' War was exceedingly brutal for its generation, just as the European war has been for its time.
5. The Thirty Years' War was a very long one for its generation; the European war has been a relatively long one for recent times.

As to differences between the two wars, it may be said that:

1. In the Thirty Years' War both belligerents finally proved to be nearly equal in strength. In the European war one of the belligerents, though meeting with reversals at first, in the end completely overcame the other.
2. The Thirty Years' War ended in the exhaustion of both

belligerents; the European war closed with the exhaustion of only one belligerent.

3. The Thirty Years' War was waged for religious convictions, rather than for gain; the European war was not so ideal in its purposes.

Taking a general view of the similarities and differences between the two wars, the one great question arises: Is the experience of the present European war strong enough for the victors and vanquished to be willing to yield sufficient of their natural rights and sovereignty, to submit all questions of war to some superior international court, from which there is no appeal?

In the Thirty Years' War nothing further was necessary; the exhaustion of both belligerents was sufficient to end religious wars.

As the victorious party in war is much less inclined (if inclined at all) *than the conquered foe to yield anything*, will all the Allies, without the experience of defeat and exhaustion, be willing to yield enough of their sovereignty to make the future peace of the world permanent. Will they be magnanimous and give up some national advantages of the present for future international benefits to all mankind? In short, are they unselfish enough to so temper their justice with mercy as to establish a world peace, the greatest boon to humanity ever known?

Here is a supreme opportunity. Will all the victorious Allies arise to the occasion and make future wars improbable, if not impossible?

We say "impossible," because if a nation is recalcitrant, it can be punished by a general boycott, leading towards its economic ruin. As selfishness is the most powerful influence in nations as well as individuals, it is almost a moral certainty that no nation could or would submit very long to such punishment.

Just after a war is ended, and the belligerents feel more keenly its effects, than later on, they are much more disposed

to make mutual concessions. Will the victors of the European war strike *at once*, while the iron is hot, and insist *at the outset* on the one great paramount issue, the absolute prohibition of all wars? Such a decision would radiate through all further proceedings of the League of Nations and facilitate greatly its work. By thus making a certainty of the most important question of all history, no matter how difficult and delicate matters of greater or less importance may be, the League of Nations will have assured its success in advance, as the greatest and most beneficent that the world has ever had, just as the Peace of Westphalia was in its generation.

In the Peace Treaty of Westphalia were these words: "The hostilities that have taken place from the beginning of the late disturbances, in any place of whatsoever kind, by one side or the other, shall be forgotten and forgiven, so that neither party shall cherish enmity or hatred against, nor molest nor injure the other for any cause whatsoever."

Will the Peace Treaty contain as generous and noble words, and stop all political wars forever, just as the Peace of Westphalia put an end to all religious wars?

Will the twentieth century Christianity, with its supposed greater liberality and enlightenment, be as far seeing, unselfish and effective as the Christianity of the seventeenth century?

Let the League of Nations answer Yes.

Just as the spread of education and knowledge gradually liberated the intellect, so as to undermine the ideas upon which religious wars were based, so a similar process of enlightenment may be necessary to cause political wars to cease.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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V.

THE ANABAPTISTS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION
TO MODERN LIFE.

JOHN C. GEKELER.

The value of any body of insurgents is never properly estimated at the time of their insurgency. Only after the test of time has been applied to their works, as well as to the works of those against whom they have contested, that a true estimate of the worth of their ideas and ideals can be secured. The Anabaptists of the sixteenth century and later were looked upon as veritable pests by the men with whom they contested. That they have contributed certain elements of worth to modern life is admitted by informed students of history. While they were the radicals of the Reformation period, often inclined to become fanatical, upon the whole they were a pious, sincere folk. Springing largely from the humbler classes of the people, they were often ignorant, and, hence, easily fell prey to adventurers. They were a misunderstood, as well as, often, a misguided people. The age in which they lived knew nothing of charitable toleration, and so their history is marked by intensely cruel and wicked persecution.

While many of the practices of the Anabaptists are to be found among the pre-Reformation sects, there was no consciousness of any historical connection with them on the part of the early leaders of the new movement. Not until after the disastrous Münster Republic does there seem to have been any claim on their part to such historic connection. Then Menno Simons, who became the recognized leader, in his attempt to disown connection with the Münster fanatics, and, so, escape persecution, traced the movement back to the Waldensees. While he was unhistoric in this, it is still an open question

just how great may have been the influence of the Waldensees upon the radicals of Switzerland.

As early as 1522 there was a group of radicals in Zurich with whom at first Zwingli seems to have had some sympathy, and with whom he associated in their meetings for a brief while. These men wished to move faster in the reformation of the church than Zwingli was willing to move, even in the things in which he agreed with them. Thus, for example, while he believed in the liberty of Christians relative to the use of foods during Lent, and, indeed, delivered a sermon which later was issued as his first writing upon the Reformation, viz., "Liberty Respecting Food in Lent," he himself did not practice that liberty in which he believed, and even proclaimed. In this respect he remained subject to the city council as an obedient citizen, since they controlled the regulations concerning food during the fast periods. The radicals, however, did eat meat during that Lent. They thus came to suspect and distrust his sincerity. In the summary to the section on "Of Avoiding Vexation" in the above address he states his principles of conduct in the following conclusions: "IV. But when the practice of liberty offends your neighbor, you should not offend or vex him without cause; for when he perceives it, he will be offended no more, unless he is angry purposely, as when at the disciples' eating with unwashed hands and on the Sabbath: Mark ii: 24.

"V. But you are to instruct him as a friend in the belief, how all things are proper and free for him to eat. Romans xv: 1—'We who are strong in the faith shall receive the weak'—that is, comfort and instruct them.

"VI. But when forgiving avails not, do as Christ said, Matthew xv: 14, 'Let them go.'

"VII. And use your liberty, wherever you can without public disturbance, just as Paul did not have Titus circumcised, Gal. 11: 3.

"VIII. But if it causes public uproar, do not use it, just as Paul had Timothy circumcised, Acts xvi: 3.

"IX. Gradually teach the weak with all industry and care, until they are instructed, so that the number of the strong is so large that no one, or still only a few, can be offended: for they will certainly let themselves be taught: so strong is the Word of God, that it will not remain without fruit. Isaiah lv: 10." Cf. *Works*, Vol. 1, p. 104—Jackson.

With all his fervor for the reformation of the church and society, Zwingli was yet conservative, and seems to have been unwilling to move faster than public opinion as represented in the City Council warranted, while at the same time he endeavored through his sermons and teaching to mold that opinion. The temperament of the men opposed to him was entirely different, and seems to have colored their view.

Included within the group of radicals opposed to Zwingli were men with whom he had been closely associated. Felix Manz, who was a good Hebraist, had been his assistant. Conrad Grebel had been converted from a dissolute life through Zwingli's influence. Both men came from substantial families in the city and were a considerable addition to the ranks of the radicals. Later a third friend of Zwingli joined their ranks, Dr. Balthasar Hubmaier, who became his chief opponent in the Disputations. He had been influenced to adopt the evangelical position through the writings of Luther, and had been at first the pupil, colleague and friend of Eck, Luther's great antagonist. As early as 1523 he came to doubt the validity of infant baptism. Driven from his home at Waldshut where he was rendering good service to the cause of reform by the storm consequent upon the Peasant's Revolt, he was later imprisoned at Zurich because of his Anabaptist principles. Manz and Grebel arrived at the view of believers' baptism which is one of the distinctive doctrines of the Anabaptists' a year later. At the First Disputation held in 1523 Zwingli offered to discuss the doctrine of baptism, and expressed himself as follows concerning infant baptism (cf. Jackson, *Huldreich Zwingli*, 243): "Although I know, as the Fathers show, that infants have been baptized occasionally from the earliest

times, still it was not so universal a custom as it is now, but the common practice was as soon as they arrived at the age of reason to form them into classes for instruction in the Word of Salvation (hence they were called catechumens, *i.e.*, persons under instruction). And after a firm faith had been implanted in their hearts and they had confessed with their mouth, then they were baptized. I could wish that this custom of giving instruction were revived to-day, *viz.*, since children are baptized so young their religious instruction might begin as soon as they come to sufficient understanding. Otherwise they suffer a great and ruinous disadvantage if they are not as well religiously instructed after baptism as the children of the ancients were before baptism, as sermons to them still preserved show."

In his first book on baptism published in May, 1525, his position on infant baptism is given in the proposition as quoted by Jackson, *Huldreich Zwingli*, 257. "II. Infant Baptism, 4. The children of Christians are not less the children of God than their parents are, or than the children in the Old Testament times were: but if they belong to God who will refuse them water baptism? 5. Circumcision in the Old Testament was the same sign as baptism in the New; so as the former was applied to children of the one so should baptism be to those of the latter." It can scarcely, then, be affirmed that Zwingli doubted the authority and validity of infant baptism, though he may have questioned the wisdom of it when it was not followed by proper instruction. Never placing the emphasis on the sacraments as did Luther, he felt that infants, whether baptized or not, were saved. Although Hubmaier, as early as 1523, had in theory rejected infant baptism, he still continued its practice. Dr. Mayer in his *History of the German Reformed Church*, 209, quotes his account of his practice: "Instead of baptizing them, I convene the church, bringing in the infant, and in the vernacular tongue expounding the gospel—'Little children were brought to him,' &c. Thereupon, the name being given, the whole church kneel and pray for the

little one. . . . But if the parents are yet infirm, and insist upon having their offspring baptized, I baptize it. In practice, I am weak with those who are yet weak, until they be better informed; but in doctrine, I do not yield the smallest particle."

As evidencing Zwingli's broad, conciliatory spirit, two conferences were held with the radicals during the summer of 1524 without accomplishing anything. In a Disputation held in the opening of the year 1525, after the to-be-looked-for failure to convince, Council ordered all parents who had up until then refrained from having their infants baptized, "to present them for this purpose within a week on pain of banishment." It was not until after this Disputation that they denied the validity of infant baptism, and soon afterwards took the step demanded by the logic of their position. At a private home in Zollicon, a few miles distant from Zurich, on February 7, 1525, Conrad Grebel baptized the former monk George Blaurock. In turn Blaurock baptized several others who had been baptized in infancy. The mode employed was that of sprinkling. The nick-name of "Anabaptizers, or Rebaptizers," was given them in consequence. They, however, disputed the correctness of the name which has thus been applied to them, since in their view baptism had not up until then been administered to them.

The first break between the radicals and Zwingli came at the Second Disputation in October of 1523 over the doctrine of the Church and the administration of the Lord's Supper. Although he had taught that images and pictures in the church savored of idolatry, they were allowed to remain. Late in the year 1523 he had come to advanced position on the doctrine of the mass, and resigned as priest, since he could not perform its duties, as they were against his conscience. Council continued him as preacher. During August his treatise on the Canon of the Mass was published, in which he declared his position on the Lord's Supper as a memorial by which the zeal of the worshipper is stimulated, and not as a sacrifice. At the

Second Disputation the radicals demanded the removal of all images from the churches and that the Supper be administered in strict imitation of the New Testament simplicity. In these Disputations, as in subsequent discussions, the Anabaptists were at fundamental odds with the Reformation doctrines as taught by Zwingli and also by Luther. Their conception of the Bible was legalistic and mechanical. "They made the Bible literally their law," regarding it as "a new law in the Church and State, through obedience to which God's favor is to be preserved" (cf. Walker, *History of Christian Church*, p. 368). It followed naturally that they were out of harmony with the two branches of the Reformation concerning the conduct of the Church and the administration of the sacraments. "They had as little sympathy with Luther's conception of the Gospel as summed up in the forgiveness of sins, as with the Roman conception of salvation through the sacraments" (Walker, *supra*). The principles of the movement were expressed in Seven Articles of Faith framed by a former monk, Michael Sattler. (1) Believers' baptism, (2) the Church to be composed of regenerate persons only—"united as the body of Christ by common observance of the Lord's Supper," (3) excommunication the only weapon of punishment in the church, (4) the rejection of all "servitude of the flesh," (5) the control of the congregation to be separated from the State, (6) local self-discipline, (7) non-participation in the government, including refusal to bear arms (cf. Walker, *History Christian Church*, p. 368). Among them are to be found a variety of doctrinal beliefs. There were some like Denk and Hut who laid claim to the gift of prophecy through "an inner light," and who taught the visible return of Christ. Others believed in the community of goods.

The doctrine of the church as taught by Zwingli, and in which he was in harmony with the other Reformers, drew a distinction between the visible and invisible church. Of the visible church all baptized persons are members, whether having that experience of faith that alone entitles them to be

called Christian, or not. The visible church thus composed of all baptized persons in a community possesses all the powers of the Church universal with authority to discipline and to legislate for its own guidance. Thus in Zwingli's theory, in common with that generally held in his day, there was a community of interests between the Church and State. Cobb, in *The Rise of Religious Liberty in America*, thus describes the conception of the relation of Church and State prevailing in Europe at the time of the Pilgrim Fathers: "The Old World Idea, developed and illustrated in the passage of sixteen centuries, had thus in all lands, both those under the Roman See and those divided between the followers of Luther and Calvin, this common principle—a root out of which came many variations—that the State should legislate for the benefit of the Church; that the Church should look to the State for support and defence; and that the State should recognize and establish a particular Church as the representative of the only legalized form of religion and worship," p. 65. Much of that description will apply to the idea of Zwingli. There was, however, present in his theory an element of democracy, latent, indeed, but still present, and which in time would have resulted in a wider separation of the Church from the State. At the time, and under the circumstances prevailing, this relation of Church and State gave a certain strength to the Reformers in their contest with Rome. There was also the possibility of cruel oppression for all who differed from the prevailing doctrinal view, a possibility that came to actuality in the sad experience of the Anabaptists. Against this theory the Anabaptists protested. They demanded an entire separation between Church and State, and when the Council ordered, at the close of the Second Disputation, that they present their unbaptized children for baptism they dared to disobey the mandate as in violation of the law of God. Into the Church as they conceived it are to be admitted only the regenerate, or those whom the Reformers held composed the invisible Church. The distinction between the visible and invisible Church was ignored by

the Anabaptists. It is this conception of the absolute separation of the control of the Church from the State, and the control of the conduct of the individual which goes with the union of Church and State in its varied forms, that has been the peculiar glory of the Anabaptists, and is their great contribution to modern life.

When arguments failed to persuade the radicals, the Zurich Council resorted to banishment, and finally to the death penalty. By a hideous irony Zurich decreed that the "rebaptizers and rebaptized" should be put to death by drowning. On February 5, 1527, Felix Manz became the first martyr by drowning in Lake Zurich. Sattler had his tongue torn out. Hubmaier died at the stake, while his wife met her death by drowning. Blaurock was burned. "Under the rule of Philip II of Spain 6,000 are said to have been put to death and the final persecution of 1659 almost extinguished some of the heresies" (Anabaptists and kindred sects) (*cf.* Fisher, *The Making of Pennsylvania*, p. 119). While the persecution deprived the movement of its ablest leaders, it did not check it. In the place of men like Manz, Grebel, Hubmaier, other men of less ability assumed the leadership. "Yet the movement continued to spread, and by 1529 was exceedingly perilous for the Protestant cause, being looked upon by the Catholics as the legitimate outcome of the revolt from Rome, dividing the forces of reform, and to the thinking of the Lutherans bringing the Evangelical cause into discredit" (Walker, *History of Christian Church*, 369). Obtaining large numbers of its adherents among the poorer laboring classes, the movement threatened to displace Protestantism throughout Germany and the Netherlands.

The Anabaptist movement should be carefully distinguished from the Peasant Revolt in Germany. Both movements sprang from the liberalizing tendency prevalent in Europe during the sixteenth century. Looked upon as efforts of the human spirit to cast off fetters, the movements known as Humanism, the Reformation, the Peasants' Revolt were kindred

movements. Humanism was the striving for intellectual freedom, the Peasants' Revolt was an economic movement which sought to break an economic bondage, while the Reformation was primarily concerned with a spiritual freedom from ignorance and superstition as represented by the Roman hierarchy. The Anabaptist movement belongs distinctively to the spiritual side of this great human striving for clearer light. But as human life, although manifesting itself in various ways, is a marvelous entity, the three movements intermingled and mutually reacted upon each other. As the Reformation, though distinct from Humanism, cannot be clearly understood apart from all reference to it, so the Peasants' Revolt, although primarily an economic movement, cannot be altogether separated from the great spiritual movement and its doctrines as taught by Zwingli and Luther. The Peasants' Revolt was largely inspired by religious principles, and sought to inaugurate the application of what to-day in many respects seems only a crude democracy and essential justice. The fanatical elements commingling with the movement blinded the religious leaders of the day to the real worth of the movement for society. Hence it was savagely crushed. Many of the leaders were given to mysticism, as Thomas Munzer, and the revolutionary Carlstadt. Among them there was a general rejection of infant baptism and a demand for a complete separation of Church and State. Indeed, the Peasants sought the destruction of government as then constituted, and the erection of a kingdom of saints in its place. On the other hand the Swiss Anabaptists recognized the necessity of government for the ungodly, and, while they sought a separation of Church and State, they merely withdrew from participation in it.

The Münster Republic and its disaster is a part of the story of the Anabaptists, although they cannot fairly be charged with it, since it was a perversion of the movement as taught by Grebel and his companions. It grew out of the tendency to mysticism and chialism so frequent among the Anabaptists. Melchoir Hoffmann was one of those who believed in the gift

of prophecy. A furrier by occupation, he found great delight and comfort in the prophetic portions of the Bible. Becoming a Lutheran, he later adopted Zwingli's views of the Lord's Supper and found refuge in Strassburg, where he experienced another change in religious sentiment and became an Anabaptist. Relying upon his prophetic powers, after studying the Apocalypse, he proclaimed the visible return of Christ, designating Strassburg as the new Jerusalem, and set the year 1533 as the time of final consummation of the kingdom. Foretelling that he should suffer imprisonment for a period of six months at Strassburg, he went there to await the glorious fulfillment of his dreams. He did suffer imprisonment, but it was for a period ending only with his death ten years later in 1543. Jan Mathys, a Dutch baker, represented himself as Enoch, whose coming Hoffmann had predicted. He was joined by another Dutchman, Jan Beukelssen, a tailor. Since Strassburg evidently declined the honor destined for it by Hoffmann, the new leaders selected Münster as the site of the millennial kingdom. Large numbers of the faithful from Germany and Holland flocking thither, the city came under their control and they established things according to their own ideas. All kinds of excesses were rife. The community of goods and polygamy were instituted. All who opposed were rigorously and bloodily suppressed. Unable to distinguish between a true liberty which is subject to law, and a wild, unrestrained license, they fell into all kinds of grossly sensual sins. Catholic prince and bishop joined with Lutheran prince and preacher and together their forces recaptured the city, June, 1535. The results were disastrous to multitudes of innocent people, and to the cause of the Reformation in general. The effect upon Lutheranism was a strengthening of their belief in the orderliness of the State Church and the control of the princes. "It freed Lutheranism from the Anabaptist rivalry, but it made Lutheranism even more positively than before a party of princely and middle-class sympathies" (Walker, *History Christian Church*, p. 375).

After the Münster disaster the better element among the Anabaptists rallied around Menno Simons, or Simonis, who is characterized as an honest, sincere, pious man, seeking to live, and to help others to live, a simple Christian life according to the teaching of the Scriptures. He had one time been a Catholic priest. Both he and his associates disclaimed all connection with the Münster fanatics, claiming no historic relation whatever, and endeavored to trace their origin among the Waldensees. During the years 1543-1545 his headquarters were at Cologne, from which center he was able to give encouragement and direction to the Anabaptists of the Rhine Valley. Under his leadership, despite his doctrinal vagaries and strict discipline, the sect attained considerable numbers by the time of his death in 1559. He sympathized with the earlier leader Hoffmann in his views concerning the incarnation of Christ involving a denial of the true humanity of our Lord. In 1555 a conference of German Anabaptists at Strassburg expressed dissatisfaction with these views, declaring "we should be content with the statement, 'The Word became flesh and tabernacled among us.'" Two years later another conference asserted the liberty of the churches to deal with individual cases of discipline according to their merits, particularly in reference to his rule of marital avoidance in case of wife or husband who might have been excluded from the fellowship of the church. Both incidents are characteristic of the sect in their satisfaction with the literal word, and their insistence upon the right of local self-discipline. The name by which the Anabaptists became known down to the present, viz., Mennonites, is derived from him (*cf. Newman, Manual of Church History*, p. 178 f.).

Because of the persecution following upon the Münster affair, large numbers of Mennonites migrated to England, where they settled in the eastern counties. Here coming into contact with the Separatists their influence has been continued in both English and American church life. Walker, in his volume on Congregationalism in the American Church History

Series and in his *History of the Christian Church*, admits the influence of Anabaptism upon Congregationalism. Robert Browne, who began as a Presbyterian Puritan, became imbued with the teachings of Separatism, and in connection with Robert Harrison at Norwich organized a Separatist church about 1581. "But Norfolk was a county (Norwich located there) whose country towns contained a large admixture of Dutch handicraftsmen, and the suggestion seems a probable one that the Anabaptist modes of thought, imported with these Hollanders into their new home, may have affected Browne himself in his conception of the Church. Though no trace of a recognition of indebtedness to Anabaptist thought can be found in Browne's writings, and though we discover no Dutch names among the small number of his followers whom we know by name at all, the similarity of the system which he now works out to that of the Anabaptists is so great in many respects that the conclusion is hard to avoid that the resemblance is more than accidental." Newman, in *Manual of Church History*, writes in a similar strain (*cf.* 273). Through opposition of the English, Browne and his followers were compelled to find refuge in Holland, where they settled at Middleburg in 1581. From Holland Browne sent out literature into England. In one of these writings he set forth fully his doctrine of the Church. "A Christian church is a body of professed believers in Christ, united to one another and to their Lord by voluntary covenant. This covenant is the constitutive element which transforms an assembly of Christians into a church. Its members are not all the baptized inhabitants of a kingdom, but only those possessed of Christian character. Such a church is under the immediate headship of Christ, and is to be ruled only by the laws and officers of his appointment. To each church Christ has intrusted its own government, discipline and choice of officers." While rejecting the Mennonite theory of believers baptism, the influence of the Anabaptist movement is continued to the present through the great Congregational Church. Insistence has always been made

upon the right of the individual to worship God free from the dictation of the State, and thus they have contributed to the large degree of freedom enjoyed in modern life.

The influence of Anabaptism is also continued through the Baptist Church, who have had close historical connections with the movement. John Smyth, the organizer of a Separatist congregation at Gainsboro in 1602, found England as uncomfortable as other Separatists. The little congregation numbered among their members two names illustrious in American colonial history, William Brewster and John Robinson. Before the migration of the little band of Puritan Separatists to that haven of the oppressed, Holland, it was divided into two portions, one under the leadership of Smyth and the other under Brewster and Robinson. After settling in Holland, Smyth fell under the influence of the Mennonites and was drawn to their view of baptism. "It was . . . probably in the year, 1609, that Smyth, led thereto by contact with the Mennonites of Amsterdam, adopted Baptist views, and reorganizing his church, baptized himself and his associates" (*cf.* Walker, *Amer. Church Hist. Series*, p. 58). Later on the eccentric Smyth fell out with his associates. "It was probably the year of his death (1612) that his associates till the quarrel of 1609, Helwys and Murton, established in London the first Baptist church on English soil (*cf.* Whitsitt, *Johnson Ency.*). The mode of baptism employed was that of sprinkling, as no other mode was in use among the Mennonites, and the question of mode was not raised until some time afterwards. When Smyth sought to join the Mennonites, who criticized him for having baptized himself on the ground that he did not have apostolic succession in baptism, he was kept with his congregation under a long probation, which lasted until his death. Helwys and Murton refused to follow him and enter the Mennonite communion. "Though the company of Helwys and Murton had refused to enter the Mennonite communion, they had not escaped the influence of the Mennonites. They lost in Holland that assured faith which they

had carried thither in the doctrines of the Calvinistic system, and had become Arminians. The denomination which they founded has ever since been known as General Baptists, owing to the fact that they believed in a general atonement. They also surrendered the Brownist constitution, and borrowed from the Mennonites the constitution with elders and deacons which has now become almost universal among Baptists. They stoutly refused to accept the Mennonite opinion regarding oaths and the magistracy, but were much disposed to favor the idea that it is sinful for a Christian man to bear arms" (Whitsitt).

An early confession of faith composed about 1611 shows the Anabaptist influence. "That the magistrate is not by virtue of his office to meddle with religion or matters of conscience, to force or compel men in this or that form of religion or doctrine, but to leave Christian religion free to every man's conscience, and to handle only civil transgressions (Romans 13), injuries, and wrongs of man against man, in murder, theft, etc., for Christ only is the king and lawgiver of the Church and the conscience (James 4: 12)" (Amer. Church Hist. Series, Vol. II, p. 44). At about the same date Helwys wrote as follows, revealing how great an influence the Mennonites had been in stiffening opposition to the interference of the state in matters of conscience. "The king is a mortal man and not God, therefore hath no power over the immortal souls of his subjects, to make laws and ordinances for them, and to set spiritual lords over them. If the king have authority to make spiritual lords and laws, then he is an immortal God and not a mortal man" (*supra*, p. 44). This stout defence of freedom of conscience certainly sounds like Anabaptist teaching. This stout defence of freedom has been maintained by all branches of the Baptists, the Calvinistic branch equally well as the Arminian branch. Following the Great Awakening led by Edwards and Whitefield, the Baptists experienced a very substantial growth in America. They became particularly strong in Virginia, where they were made to suffer for their faith. Their perse-

cution elicited the aid of men like Patrick Henry and James Madison, both of whom defended them in the courts. Thus both by their spoken protests and their sufferings they contributed largely to the cause of religious liberty in Virginia, and, since Virginia was the first to proclaim an unrestricted religious liberty, and her example was followed by other colonies and states, the nation at large.

It has been shown how through the connection with Holland by the Congregationalists and the Baptists of England that the Anabaptist principles were perpetuated in more vigorous form, and in a form more capable of exerting greater influence upon history than as held by the Anabaptists themselves. These principles have profoundly influenced American religious and political life. Through the Congregationalists the principle of the independence of the local congregation from state control has been continued. Through the Baptists this same principle has found expression together with the Anabaptist principle of believers' baptism. Neither of these two great religious bodies accepted their principles of non-participation in government and abstention from bearing arms. These latter principles have found expression in modern life through the Mennonites and kindred bodies.

Between the Mennonites and the Quakers, who arose in England a century later than the Anabaptists, there are many similarities of doctrine. When Penn travelled through Holland and Germany he was readily accepted by the Mennonites, a fraternization that has continued between the two bodies in this country. Accepting Penn's invitation to settle in his colony, the first Mennonites arrived in Pennsylvania in 1683 under the leadership of Franz Daniel Pastorius. A university student in law and theology, a lecturer upon law at Frankfurt, Pastorius was a remarkable man with great powers of leadership. He was school teacher and public office holder as well as preacher. In the settlement at Germantown that aversion of the Anabaptists to participation in public affairs was plainly manifested. Incorporated in 1689, Pastorius was the

first burgomaster of Germantown and served in like capacity in 1692, 1696, 1697, while at other times he was town clerk. The conscientious objection of the Mennonites to serving the State was a real hindrance in the early settlement of the community. Faust in *The German Element in the United States*, Vol. 2, p. 123, relates how the "settlers of Germantown were embarrassed by the frequent resignations of the men of their choice, and imposed a fine of three pounds upon any one who should refuse to serve after election to public office. Mennonites and some other sectarians successfully pleaded a conflict with their religion, but others were not excused without showing good cause." In 1703 Pastorius wrote to Penn "complaining of the difficulty of getting his people to serve as public officers" (Faust, *supra*, 39). Great credit should be given the Mennonites of Germantown for making the first protest in American history against negro slavery. In 1688 they sent a petition, prepared by Pastorius and signed by several others, to the Quaker quarterly meeting, praying that they make the subject a matter of debate and action. It was referred to the annual meeting by whom it was "voted not fitting for the Association to pass judgment upon the matter, since it stood in intimate relation with other matters" (*cf.* Faust, *supra*, 46, also Fisher, *The Making of Pennsylvania*, 73).

The contribution of the Anabaptists thus is seen to have been a wholesome one. The fears of Zwingli and the other early opponents of the movement are seen not to have been realized. True, the fires of affliction purged it of much dross. They have been staunch champions of liberty in religious matters, and since men think politically as they think religiously, the Anabaptists and their spiritual descendants have contributed largely to civil liberty. While the Mennonites, because of their religious scruples, have not made as large a contribution to the intellectual and religious life as they otherwise might have, they have contributed substantially to the economic life of the communities where they are located. A simple, quiet, peace-loving people, they have consistently main-

tained their religious principles, and contributed to the building of the Kingdom of God in America. Even their silent protest against the prevailing customs by the very simplicity of their habit has had its effect. So also their refusal to bear arms, while difficult for other people to understand, will doubtless bear fruit for righteousness. Their history reveals the wondrous ways of Providence. Of many peoples God has built the human race, and He has a place for each in the working out of His purposes for that race.

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VI.

PRESENT-DAY PIETY AND RELIGION.

FREDERICK C. NAU.

The statement is frequently heard that there is a marked lack of piety in the church to-day. This opinion arises primarily from a comparison of the religious life of our time with that of ages past.

In an age like ours, when material interests so absorb the thought and time of the people; in a scientific age, when everything from the lifeless atom in the mineral kingdom to the ideas of God, the soul and prayer, are subjected to the most critical analysis; in an age of democracy, when authority in state and church do not command the obedience and inspire the reverence of other days; in such a time, do we find genuine piety? In a time when writers are seeking to vindicate an inarticulate religion, and when the fires on Christian family altars are burning low, or in countless homes are extinguished; and in a period when, according to latest statistics, church attendance has decreased, is there any evidence of piety among Christian people?

In answering such questions we are compelled to say no and yes. No, the piety of past centuries and of our fathers is not the piety of to-day. But a new type of piety, or religious life, is appearing. And this new type is not characterized by the asceticism of the Monastic period, neither by the theological tests of the Middle Ages and Reformation periods, nor the mysticism of Spener, Franke and Lavater, the Puritanism of old New England days, nor by the ritualism of the church of Rome. The modern piety which is developing is like the mother that gave it birth. It springs from a new conception of religion, and it must be in accordance with this new con-

ception. Religion deals with three realms: the inner life, the outer life, and the future life. In these realms first things must be first, and every unbiased interpreter will seek to place first things first. That means, that for the inner life, *experience* will be placed first and creed will come next. In the realm of the *outer life*, that is of *conduct*, inspiration will always precede restraint or prohibition. Religion will not consist chiefly of a multitude of "don'ts" and prohibitions, but it will be a dynamic that will inspire men to be good, brave, unselfish, and godly. As to the future life, religion is not so much insurance against judgment in the other world as it is a program and a power for this present world.

This new idea of religion is producing a new kind of saint, and a new type of piety. This piety, in a word, will be, briefly and simply, goodness and godliness. And if we define it in Christian terms, it is nothing more nor less than the life of Jesus reproduced in the men of the modern world. Thus we need not be unduly alarmed because one type of piety is passing, for a new type, which is just as truly religious as the old, is being evolved in the church of our time.

1. *This piety is characterized by naturalness.*—The religious man to-day is natural and manly—free from sanctimoniousness, cant and bigotry, as well as maudlin sentimentality. If he is natural and manly he may be like Jesus. The simple, natural life of Jesus is appealing to men of our time. The Jesus who grew in stature and wisdom, who worked in the carpenter shop, who lived close to nature's heart and loved birds and flowers and little children and went about doing good, is the Jesus men admire and adore. Cardinal Newman said he could not bear to read about Jesus the carpenter because the thought of Him as a working man interfered with his worship of the Divine Lord. He preferred to read of His Transfiguration and Resurrection. To-day, men love to dwell on the human traits of the Master, for they are learning that the way to a true realization of Jesus' divinity is the stairway of his sublime humanity. John Fiske elaborated this truth for us

in his *Through Nature to God*, and Dr. George A. Gordon enunciated the same principle in his book, *Through Man to God*.

We are coming to learn that natural instincts are not evil and need not be crushed in order to enable us to lead the Christian life. "The Son of Man came eating and drinking" and only bigoted Pharisees called him a glutton and wine bibber. Natural instincts, it is true, are often corrupted and perverted. They are then to be purified, and directed to new and noble uses. But they need not be rooted out.

Self must not be suppressed in the life of the Christian. Modern psychology seconds the New Testament in teaching respect and reverence for the self. This self is the mind and spirit, the higher part of our natures. It is to be asserted and not subdued. Self-assertion and self-expression need not be contrary to self-renunciation and true humility. Jesus asserted himself against every enemy of his Kingdom. He gave himself sacrificially for the perpetuation of his Kingdom. A nobler combination of these two, seemingly antithetical dispositions of self-assertion and self-renunciation, can not be found in all history than is found in the heroic life and death of Edith Cavell. Christianity calls for a free and frank and virile expression of personality. Virility and humility go hand in hand in the best of men. We are to live, not softly and in seclusion, but naturally, militantly, aggressively and even dangerously. And the saint of our time must not hold aloof from the world. He should be vitally interested in all the affairs of this world. He should enter freely into the world's life and have part in the world's work. He should love this world, because it is good and beautiful, and should help to overcome the evil in it. He should not sigh to leave it, but should feel very much at home in it. This may be a hard and difficult world at times, but it is a good world for all who would be brave, and strong, dauntless and chivalrous. This world is God's supreme opportunity for making manhood and it is man's supreme opportunity for becoming Christ-like.

In this sense the pious man will be sincerely worldly and truly natural. From the natural life of man it is only one step to his social life.

2. *Present-day piety must be social.*—This is almost a commonplace thing to say. But when we recall the utterly anti-social life of the Pharisee, the religionist of Jesus' day, and hear our Lord's scathing denunciation of him for "devouring widows' houses," we can not too strongly emphasize the social requirements of the saint of to-day. He must have the social mind, the social conscience and a burning social passion—like Amos and Micah, and Jesus Himself. His social spirit will be revealed first of all in the home, in his relations with those nearest to him. In fact, the family ideal should be the pole star of all of man's social relations. The principles of parenthood and brotherhood should be applied in all the realms of society. We need not fear the bugaboo of paternalism. The "Big Five," those noble distributors of our daily bread, are earnestly warning us against the perils of a paternalistic government. But these great benefactors of the race are not our models of piety. A certain measure of paternalism is needed in the state. Without some degree of paternalism there can be no just fraternalism, no well-ordered brotherhood. Capitalism is a failure without the oversight and checkmates, as well as the encouragements of a government based upon the will of the people. Capitalism fails to prevent unemployment, exploitation of the weaker members of society, and poverty, unless guided and aided by wise government. We are not opposed to the capitalistic system, but we believe that this system can and will only serve the people (and that is the only reason for its existence) under the control and protection of a strong people's government. Capitalism, our present economic system, should not be Lord and Master of the people, but the big brother to the people. It will not be such, however, if left to its own devices. Neither the capitalist nor the proletariat is competent to control the production and distribution of the world's food, clothing, homes and machinery. Both are actu-

ated by self-interest. The only power that can safely be entrusted with this task is a democratic government, whose sole function is to serve all of the people. Adam Smith's *laissez faire* or "hands off" theory of political economy is antiquated. It has led to industrial autocracy. But so also is Karl Marx's theory of proletarian rule, and control of industry by the so-called producer, manual laborer (?), tool-user (the only true man(?)), out of date. This has led to Bolshevism and mobocracy in state and industry. Control of industry by a disinterested and wise agency, called government, is the new paternalism which is fast coming. Economic systems should never rule a people. The new era will bring us industrial democracy controlled by strong, centralized political democracy. This will mean the Christianization of government and industry. In every sphere of the world's life, in the political, industrial or international, the present-day Christian would have the family spirit pervade the whole. Whether preacher or layman, teacher or tradesman, employer or employee, he will courageously hold aloft the social ideals of Jesus. He will enter the fight that is raging, and valiantly battle against autocracy of any stripe, and for the triumph of social justice and the rights of man the world over. He will never retreat. He will not flee from the battle like a deserter, nor shut himself up in the cloister or the church and say: "Stop talking about social duties, political wrongs, and economic conditions in your pulpits!" "Preach the Gospel." "Give us scriptural sermons, the kind we used to hear in the good old times." No! The saint of to-day has different stuff in him. Like Nehemiah of old, busily engaged in attending to the social and political duties of the returned captives, he will say: "Shall such a man as I flee to the temple to save his life?" Nehemiah was deeply conscious of his sacred social obligations.

The dynamic of the Christian's social life and activities will not be any specific one of the many socialistic theories, promulgated from the time of Plato's *Republic* to Karl Marx's *Kapital*, on down to the latest theory of the present day. His

dynamic and unfailing solvent for every social problem will be love—the love of Jesus. “This is my commandment that ye love one another, even as I have loved you.” His love must be supreme. This is more than the sentimental love of the camp meeting—more than the utilitarian love of some of our industrial organizations. How did Jesus love his disciples? He loved them by taking an intense personal interest in them; he loved them with understanding, by putting himself in their positions and under their conditions of life; yea, he loved them even to the point of sacrifice. Sacrificial love will remedy every ill of human society. This is the love that perfects life. This is the crowning desideratum of the saints of to-day: “That ye love one another, even as I have loved you.” No man, whether millionaire, or laborer, can be a Christian without the social mind dominated by the love of Christ. But naturalness, and the social spirit in man, need an additional element to reinforce them, and that is the moral element.

3. *The religious life to-day must be genuinely ethical.*—Naturalness without the domination of conscience is mere animalism. And it is a fact, that some men whose hearts often overflow with compassion for their weaker and poorer fellow-men have little regard for moral distinctions and ethical values. The writer happens to know the mayor of a certain western city who belonged to church. At Christmas time, through the Elks Lodge, he would give very liberal sums for the poor, and he boasted that his lodge did more for the needy than any church in town. He prided himself on his great interest in the Salvation Army. When Miss Booth was in town lecturing he dropped \$10 on the collection plate, because, he said, the Salvation Army is the friend of the poor. He never ignored an appeal for charity. Yet, this mayor, at a banquet one night, according to his custom, became hilariously drunk, insulted one of the ladies at the table, and was only saved from utter disgrace and impeachment by boon companions and convivial members of the city council. This is an extreme case,

but it is typical of innumerable cases of men who live natural and social lives, yet who are not at all guided and guarded by moral motives and ideals. In the churches of Asia Minor there were Nicolaitans who disregarded the moral law and its restrictions after they had become Christians, because, they argued, that freedom through Christ meant freedom from the moral restraints of the law. The great moral distinctions between good and bad, right and wrong, which have arisen out of the long and tortuous experience of the race, and have been codified by prophets and social leaders, find their culmination in Christian ethics. And the modern Christian is guided absolutely by Christian ethics. He dare not depart from the law of Christ one hair's breadth, adopt some of the convenient nature morality and free love ethics of some modern writers, and still call himself Christian. In spite of the evolutionary process, Christian ethics are as stable and unchanging as the everlasting hills. The Christian will shun evil, hate wrongdoing in every form, and despise and flee from sin ever more and more. He will be conscious of his own sinfulness, and seek to be saved from it as earnestly as did the sinners of olden time. He will ever give heed to the warning: "No drunkard, covetous man, liar, thief, robber, adulterer, idolater, or any such like, shall inherit the Kingdom of God." To him every sin will be considered a perversion of the natural life, and an interference with the whole moral order. The Christian life will be to him simply the natural life lived at its best under the highest law—the law of Christ. The criteria of his morality will not be such things as card-playing, theater-going, automobile riding on Sunday afternoons, the reading of the Sunday paper, or other similar diversions. His morality will be measured solely by the righteousness, justice, honesty, honor, purity, sincerity and unselfishness of his life. And the modern Christian will not lose sight of personal sin and guilt in his warfare against social iniquity. There is this danger to be guarded against in our preaching of the social Gospel. Whilst denouncing the social sins of the rich, we are apt to

forget that there are very few rich men in our congregations, and that the personal sins of the average man are just as bad as the social sins of the rich. In their zeal for social reconstruction many preachers are forgetting the personal sins of the masses, the deadly vices that are demoralizing the youth everywhere—such vices and sins as gambling, intemperance, profanity, and, worst of all, the many sexual perversions which are poisoning and ruining millions. All of these sins have a social effect, but they are first of all individual. Every sin is first personal, then social. There must always be a process of general cleaning up going on in society. The great besom of the law must never cease its operations. The outward conditions of the masses must constantly be improved by legislation. But the redemption of society through individual salvation is Christ's way, the truest and best way, and no modern method or program will be able to improve on it. First give individual salvation and the redemption of society will inevitably follow.

At this point some of our modern teachers would stop in their characterization of the modern Christian. Natural living, social service, and ethical conduct make the Christian's piety complete. Prof. Edward S. Ames in his *The Higher Individualism and The New Orthodoxy* says, in substance, that social service and moral conduct are the chief, and for him sufficient, sources of truth and joy. As motion and action in physics generate heat and light, so our social activities, our constant ministries of love and mercy, yield us a true knowledge of God and give us a satisfying peace and joy. It is true that the merciful, the peace-makers and the persecuted are blessed. It is again true that, "If ye do the will of God ye shall know of the doctrine," and that "the pure in heart shall see God." But the whole life of Jesus and the burden of the teaching in both Old and New Testaments, as well as the professed experience of the great religious leaders of all time, have always been to the effect that *purity of heart*, moral living and the doing of good works, are fruits of personal faith *in* and *love for* the unseen God.

4. And so the source of present-day piety, as that of other ages, is primarily *communion with God*. Religion is more than human goodness and social service. These are the fruits—faith in the love for God are the roots. There are two elements that constitute the true beginnings of religion. The first is man's response to the call of the mysterious, the other is his sense of dependence. The background of religion is mystery and not certain established facts. Man wonders when he looks up into the vast immeasurable expanse of the heavens. The distances overwhelm him. He is taught to think of these distances in terms of trillions. He is told that there are millions of suns as large and larger than ours in this universe. Mazzini said: "Every man should be an astronomer." Then, too, psychology has taught man a few things about the mystery of life itself. We can have only a very meager knowledge of the mysteries of the physical universe, and of the hidden secrets of the life that pervades it. Blot out one of man's five senses and you blot out whole realms of knowledge. On the other hand if one or two new senses were added to man's being, is it not reasonable to conclude that unimagined realms of truth and experience would be disclosed to him? By logical reasoning, with our present small and limited faculties, it is impossible to "find out" God. And it is only because men are so finite and limited that they argue about a finite and limited God. One of the beginnings of religion will always be man's response to the mysteries of the universe. "Deep calleth unto deep," and the deepest in man answers to the call. The *other* element in the background of religion, man's "feeling of dependence upon God," is very real. Realizing his own weakness and limitations man casts himself upon the all-powerful one and cries out: "Lead me to the rock that is higher than I!" To commune with the invisible God is the highest achievement of the soul. Piety meant originally man's filial relation to God, and it means that to-day, only a great deal more.

Every Christian is more or less a mystic. He can com-

mune with God "In spirit and in truth." He has the spiritual mind. "The spirit beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God." Like the Master, he goes "apart for a while to pray." He gives heed to Jesus' counsel: "When thou prayest go into thy closet, and pray in secret, and the Father who seeth in secret shall reward thee openly." In solitude and through meditation and prayer, as well as on fields of service and moral battlefields, he learns to know God. The psalmist's experience is not obsolete: "Be *still* and know that I am God."

Communion with God generates a spirit of devoutness. The call of our time is for greater devoutness of mind and heart. Devoutness preserves freshness of soul, and saves men from the blight of cynicism. A deeper spirit of reverence is needed to-day. Sincere worship of God alone produces reverence. And the modern saint needs power. If he would have power over sin, power to live the Christ life, power for service, he must have the same kind of power that the apostles received—Pentacostal power. "Ye shall receive power after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you." He who keeps in communion with God, through Christ, keeps in touch with the infinite source of power.

Moreover, the religious life of the modern man should be articulate. The inarticulate religion attributed to many of the soldiers is not only a trait of soldier life. It was simply brought to our attention more specifically during the war, when the religious life of the soldier was studied. There has always been such a silent, unexpressed religion within and outside of the church. Many good men outside of the church have been apologetically called "unconscious followers of Christ." But such a religious life is not deserving of any special praise or credit. Religion should be expressed in word and deed, for the reflex benefit the man himself will derive from it and for the good it will do to others. Jesus was not satisfied with a silent religion merely. He called for an expression of it, not only through service, but through words as

well. When ye pray, say: "Our Father." "He that confesseth me before men, him will I also confess before my heavenly Father." "Go, tell what great things the Lord hath done for thee." "Ye shall be my witnesses in Jerusalem, Samaria, and to the uttermost parts of the earth." One of the functions of the church has always been to teach her children how to cultivate and articulate their Christian faith and experience. To-day, there is a lack of devotional literature in the church for the people. There are not enough prayer books in the hands of our people for the cultivation of their heart life. Many volumes of sermonic literature come from the religious press for the preacher. Vast quantities of books and pamphlets on missions and social service are being distributed. A great deal of apologetic literature is printed every year. But there seems to be a great dearth of devotional books. Dr. Fosdick's two little classics on *The Meaning of Prayer* and *The Meaning of Faith* are somewhat too argumentative and hardly adapted for the devotional reading of the average man. Many are still receiving spiritual strength and comfort from Thomas à Kempis' *The Imitation of Christ*, Jeremy Taylor's *Holy Living and Dying*, Stark's *Handbuch*, Harbaugh's *Saints' Rest*, etc., but the theological conceptions in these noble, saintly books detract from the devotional value, they would otherwise have for people of our day. The time is ripe, I believe, for the production of a new type of religious books that will be genuine aids to soul culture, and the deepening of the inner, spiritual life of the church. The passing of the family altar is deplored. May this not be the fault of the church and her ministry? Protestantism is urging her people to work, and of course, the most of them are working hard six days of the week, during which time they should be rendering Christian service through their daily toil. Yes, the church is nobly calling men to service, but she is not diligently teaching them to pray. That is one reason why Protestantism has such a slight hold on millions of her members. The Church of Rome is teaching her people to pray, but her prayers are not all vitally Christian; they consist of many vain repetitions. However, the

point is that she, through her method, helps her members to form devotional habits. The various cults of our time require constant study and meditation of their devotees. Christian Science demands incessant reading and praying without ceasing, and the pews of her churches are always filled. Their prayers may be false, their teachings unscientific and unchristian, but their methods, requiring constant personal study and prayer, do certainly bring results, so far as church attendance and attachment to the organization are concerned. Why can not the Protestant church to-day develop a prayer literature that will really bring the people closer to God and bind them more closely to the church? It seems that we humans all love extremes. It is hard for us to be balanced. Years ago the Christian life consisted almost exclusively in church going, praying, singing and Scripture reading. Now it seems that the pendulum has swung to work and service at the expense of worship and prayer. The farthest extreme reached by anyone in this respect recently is that of Dr. Holmes of the Church of the Messiah in New York City. His scheme outdoes the Sunday afternoon socialistic meeting, or Dr. Felix Adler's Society for Ethical Culture. Jesus did not stress the one and neglect the other. Neither should we. My observation and experience as a minister among the people for more than twenty years, leads me to believe that the people have a burden on their hearts to-day, similar to the one the disciples had when they came to Jesus one day and said: "Lord, teach us to pray." Should not the church, Christ's representative in the world, follow the Master's example?

We have a congregation in Ohio that crowds a large church edifice every Sunday, and gives large sums for benevolence, whenever the opportunity is afforded. I once asked a neighboring minister for the secret of this church's remarkable success. His answer was: "Years ago, the first pastor of that congregation, the man who spent his life there, went from house to house, placed devotional books in the hands of the people and taught them to pray in their homes." "And," he remarked, "If ministers had the faith and courage and pa-

tience to do the same thing to-day, our churches would record like results." I do not know whether such results could be achieved or not, but I am convinced that the church can do far more than she is doing to help her people cultivate their spiritual life and make it more articulate and effective. She should prepare for her people a new and fitting devotional literature for the new piety of this new day.

Now, in conclusion, *what* is the goal of this Christian's life, the supreme object of all of his strivings? It is, first of all, the making of a better world, the Christianizing of the social order, and the spiritual uplift and progress of humanity. Following Christ and seeking to advance His Kingdom, "he¹ becomes ever more conscious of the forward moving tendency of human nature, its capacity for improvement, for measureless unselfishness and for nobility and ideality of character beyond all calculation or present imagination." And whilst the Christian is living the Christ-life here, and helping others to live it, whilst he is seeking the spiritual development of his own life and that of the race, he gradually becomes conscious that he is living the eternal life, which is the immortal life. Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* does not fully express the progress of the Christian man of this new age. His life is not a continuous effort and struggle to escape an evil world and to reach the celestial city. It is rather an earnest and constant endeavor to help build the city of God in this world. And, he knows that if he builds faithfully here on earth, he will some day hear the voice of the great Master Builder saying: "Well done, good and faithful servant enter thou into the joy of thy Lord!"

To sum up, then, let me repeat: The full-orbed Christian man of our age will be a man whose life will be characterized (1) by a truehearted naturalness, (2) by a genuine social spirit, (3) by the highest moral ideals, and (4) by a vital spirituality, which will express itself and be articulate in words, worship and works, and which will be to him a pledge and assurance of the life everlasting.

PITTSBURGH, PA.

¹ Professor Ames.

VII.

A SAFE DEMOCRACY.

A. W. BARLEY.

Two pregnant phrases that are very closely related have received unusual attention during the past two years. The great world-war had raged nearly three years without the nations directly involved or the world at large really understanding the issue at stake. In fact, it was generally believed that the selfish interests of the individual nations at war were the only objects sought by the contending powers.

But just previous to the entrance of the United States into the struggle, President Wilson, in his memorable address, declared that "the world must be made safe for democracy." This striking statement, and the discussion it aroused, served to clear away the uncertainties, to crystallize the aims, and to unify the efforts of the allied nations, including our own.

Immediately thereafter, and from many sources, arose another cry: "Democracy must be made safe for the world." Most frequently this statement appeared in the discussions of writers in religious papers and magazines, in dealing with the problems of the church growing out of the war. On every hand it was felt that great responsibilities rested upon the institutions charged with the proclamation of the Gospel and the saving of mankind. This in turn rested upon the belief that the wide extension of democratic principles in the matter of government would open the way for a fuller realization of the ideals of brotherhood as taught by the founder of the Christian religion. The discussion was not confined, however, to the realm of religious leaders, but was taken up anew by social and political writers generally, and treated under the light thrown upon it by the development of the war. At the present

time there seems to be a pronounced agreement that while the problem of other centuries was that of saving people from the world, the most pressing problem of the day in which we live is that of making people fit to save the world. Without doubt, a great and glorious opportunity confronts the Christian church.

Before proceeding further, it may be well to have in mind just what we mean by the word democracy. We shall not attempt any lengthy definition of the term. Briefly stated, a democracy is that form of government in which the sovereignty of the state is vested in the people, and exercised by them, either directly or indirectly by means of representative institutions. Lowell, in his Birmingham speech on "Democracy," defined it as that form of society, no matter what its political classification, in which every man had a chance, and knew that he had it." To this might be added Lincoln's conception of a democracy as a "government of the people, by the people, for the people," and the recent definition of Lyman Abbott: "Democracy is the spirit of justice, liberty and peace in the community—in one word, brotherhood."

In any true democracy, as thus defined, there must be no permanent separation of class from class; neither should there be any systematic exploitation of the weak by the strong, or of the employee by the employer. In a sense, every man is his brother's keeper. Hence, in the development of the public policy, the ideas of equal rights and of common interests will be paramount. All must work together to promote the health and comfort and happiness of the whole community or state.

It might be well to remember, however, that "the real meaning of the sentiment that men are created free and equal with certain inalienable rights, when reduced to its ultimate analysis, indicates nothing more than the right to make the laws that govern them and the right to choose the officers that shall rule over them. . . . The individual determines his right to govern through the coöperation of his fellows who are impressed with the same idea." It should be seen, therefore,

that the right to govern, or the right to freedom of individual action, comes from the judgment of society. When the collective mind has determined what is just and right—what is fair to all the people—and enacts laws and sets up the machinery necessary to enforce the same, we have democratic government.

The acceptance of this principle does not deny diversity of individual capacities and powers. It makes room, with certain restrictions, for competition between individuals for position and power. It simply requires that the freedom of one shall not invade the freedom of another. For this very reason, one of the most difficult problems in the erection of a safe democracy is to find and establish the limits of personal freedom. For without restraint upon speech or action we would have anarchy.

It is evident, then, if the ideals of democracy are to be realized, the people must understand the powers they wield. It is said that in general, the judgment of the people is correct. But their judgment certainly has a foundation. They must be reasonably intelligent. Owing to the limits of this paper, we shall not pause to enlarge upon the necessity of mental training. It is apparent to all, and we shall take it for granted. But intellectual fitness is not sufficient. The spiritual element is essential. We doubt if there is one who would deny that the will of a democracy, when thoroughly aroused, could be just as intolerant and absolute as the power of a monarch. Events of the past two years in Russia are ample proof that Bolshevism may surpass Czarism in cruelty. Democracy will not be safe until the great majority of the people have been prepared by the development of a strong moral sense, which will enable them to recognize, appreciate and defend justice in the true sense of that term. To this end we must direct our first energies. With this accomplished, we have, to quote the words of Professor Blackmar, "a social force of control which cannot be destroyed by the defects of government

machinery and the machinations of all the demagogues, nor, indeed, by the 'hungry incapacity' of office-seekers."

The chief requisites, therefore, in what we would consider a safe democracy are high ideals, a true sense of justice, and a proper conception of *what is right and wrong, whether applied to the life of the individual or to the life of the state.* Where are these to be found? It is the firm conviction of the writer that these fundamental things are the fruits of genuine religion.

Of course, there has been considerable difference of opinion as to the influence of religion on the political and social progress of the race, but it appears as a matter of fact that this influence has been a vital agency in social development. *Nowhere is this more apparent than in the development of the Hebrew people. Their religion was both legal and ethical. It defined not only the relation of the individual to God, but of the individual to his fellow-man. Some elements of the system were crude, only partially developed, but the relation is obvious.*

In the treatment of our subject that which concerns us most is the influence of religion in the development of social organization. Ward and Giddings, and others as well, recognize it as a vital factor here. Briefly stated, this influence is exerted as follows:

1. It has always been connected with social order. The control of families, tribes, groups, and even nations, has been brought about largely through religious influence.

2. It has lent a powerful sanction to virtue and morality; for it has established the relationship of individuals in the home as well as in the matrimonial life. And this long before politics and civil law were developed.

3. It has fostered a belief in immortality. This inspires hope and faith and courage—strong elements indeed in the development of man.

4. It has strengthened patriotic feeling, first in the family, then in the tribe, and later in the nation. Because of it people learned to rule and obey, to command and to serve.

5. The chief influence, however, according to some authorities, is largely subjective. *It gives the individual an ideal. It points out something toward which he may direct his energies, and gives him inspiration to reach a well-defined goal. On account of service to an authority and to a superior, he trains himself in the arts of social life. For it is imperative that the individual, and, we believe, the nation, that would improve must first learn to serve.*

Students of social and political life consider these influences of religion as general,—that is, they are to be found more or less in every ethical religion. But surely we recognize one religion as superior to all others. We believe, therefore, that these influences are most helpful and effective as they emanate from Christianity, which finds its governing principles in the life and teaching of Jesus Christ, the son of God.

We are confident that the sacrifices of the great world-war will eventually lead to the realization of the ideal suggested by President Wilson,—the world will be made safe for democracy. But we are also certain that the more difficult task remains,—to make democracy safe for the world. It is one thing to create the external conditions favorable to the development of democracy. It is quite another thing to instill the high ideals, love of justice and the spirit of self-sacrificing service essential to its maintenance. We have already stated our belief that the most helpful influences in determining the progress of humanity are those which have their source in the life and teaching of Jesus Christ. Just how is the Gospel of Christ related to the task of making democracy safe for the world?

Different writers have represented Jesus as a socialist, a monarchist, and as a democrat. We are convinced he was neither. For strictly speaking, he was committed to no particular political teaching. As Dr. Shailer Matthews says: "If men desire the sanction of Jesus for any form of government, they must appeal not to specific sayings, but to the spirit which is the basis of the ideal order." He reminds us that "Jesus

himself most naturally used the monarchical vocabulary of his people, just as Plato used that of the Athenian aristocratic democracy." But Jesus is not committed thereby to the monarchical form of government. Hence we are inclined to accept the above author's conclusion that "a government is Christian, not because it is of this or that form, but because it is attempting to realize the principles of fraternity and love that underlie the entire social teachings of Jesus."

According to our understanding of Jesus' life and teaching, his conception of a perfect society is a state in which God is loved as Father, and in which men are loved as brethren. In Jesus' simple epitome of the law,—“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind, and thy neighbor as thyself,”—the emphasis is on the word *love*. Love is the essence, the fulfilling of the law.

The teaching of Jesus that finds special favor in an ideal or safe democracy is that which centers round the value of man. God is no respecter of persons, and Jesus assumes the inherent worth and dignity of human nature, without regard to outward appearances. Neither wealth nor poverty makes a man better in his conception. He does not sacrifice one class to another. Sometimes Jesus is represented as the champion of the unpopular and despised classes as such. There is no real foundation for such a claim. Stevens is right when he says that Jesus was “a friend of publicans and sinners, not because publicans pursued an unpopular calling, or because sinners were social outcasts, but because he was a friend and helper of the needy and the erring, whatever their status in society or their calling in life.” The difference lay in the individual, not in Jesus. The common people heard him gladly. But the Scribes and Pharisees were independent. They repudiated the idea of brotherhood. In fact they belonged to an aristocracy of religion, if not of political government.

Professor Vedder, of Crozier Theological Seminary, in his book, entitled *The Gospel of Jesus and the Problems of De-*

mocracy, points out the decided advance in Jesus' position, as compared with that of the Jewish people of his day. With the latter social justice was justice owed from Jew to Jew. Thus, he might not take interest from a fellow Jew, but could extort from the foreigner. Jews were not to eat the meat of an animal that died of itself, but there was nothing to prevent him from selling it to a foreigner, and he could palm it off on the stranger at the gates. Jewish slaves could be held not longer than six years, but the unfortunate foreign slave could be held indefinitely. To quote from Vedder, "No ideas of God sustaining equal relations to all men, of a redemption for the whole world, of human right apart from clan rights, can be found in the Judaism in which Jesus was bred."

When we turn to the Gospels we find numerous utterances and acts of Christ in support of our claim concerning the democratic influence of Christianity. There can be hardly anything more truly indicative of the underlying spirit of democracy than the answer of Jesus to the couriers of John the Baptist: "Go your way and tell John what things ye have seen and heard, how that the blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, to the poor the Gospel is preached." At another time, in the synagogue, Jesus read from Isaiah, "The spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath annointed me to preach the Gospel to the poor; he hath sent me to heal the broken-hearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovery of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised." And when he concluded his reading, he said: "This day is this Scripture fulfilled in your ears." It is also significant that on several occasions it is recorded that Jesus had compassion on the multitude.

It may be well to pause at this point and refer briefly to Jesus' method in dealing with men. It is frequently, and we believe correctly, claimed that his teachings were directed to individuals. But we find that the great principles involved are mostly, if not all, applicable to society, and thus to government. While Jesus did not speak of the state directly, and

though he manifested no personal concern in the matter, he nevertheless originated movements that have greatly influenced its development. "Christ taught the need of individual regeneration, and history shows that the regeneration of men is the regeneration of society." The same method that appears in regard to the church appears also in regard to the state. Jesus laid down no definite system. He propounded principles. He aimed to affect the personal life, to the end that it would ultimately affect the world-life.

It would be almost an endless task to follow the course of Christian influence in the development of social, economic and political life as embodied in the present-day conceptions of democracy. However, we shall at least enumerate some of the phases of life that the Gospel of Christ has reached with beneficial effect:

1. It has dignified and consecrated labor, and has unquestionably been the chief factor in the destruction of slavery.

2. It has emphasized the stewardship of life, and led to new conceptions of wealth and property, and has promoted what we are pleased to call Christian beneficence.

3. It has completely changed the status of woman, and has given a new meaning to marriage, with unnumbered blessings to the home itself.

4. It has put a new value on childhood, and has hastened and supported the establishment of public schools.

5. It has affected legislation, to the end that there is greater freedom of conscience and freedom of contract, and in shaping laws has become a molder of the moral consciousness.

6. It has transformed the penal statutes of the civilized world, and thus modified the whole treatment of criminals.

When we add to these outward manifestations, the sense of brotherhood and the idealism which proceed from the same source, we have at least a partial glimpse of the transforming power of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Hence it is utterly impossible to understand the modern democratic movements and leave Christ out.

One phase in the development of a safe democracy demands

special attention in this discussion. Democracy will never be safe without marked changes in the industrial order. A glance at the situation confronting the whole world will serve to convince one of this fact. After all, the first problem of society is that of subsistence, or the production of the things essential to life. Civilization has its beginning in man's needs. Its progress is marked by increasing wants on the part of man. We are ready to concede that the workingman of to-day enjoys more of the comforts of life than his predecessor, but he is not so happy. The contrast between wealth and poverty is greater. The gross luxuries of the very rich are a constant irritation. The increase of wealth can scarcely be understood in figures. Few men will admit that there has been an equitable distribution of this increase. The laborer is conscious that he has been deprived of his fair share in the production of wealth. So on every hand we have unrest, and uprisings and protests against government and legislation which permits the few to grow immensely wealthy, while the masses remain in comparative poverty. A recent writer in the *Atlantic Monthly*, discussing the advantages gained by the laboring classes during the war, says: "In my judgment, that struggle is but the opening skirmish of a much further-reaching contest. Millions of morkers have been aroused to ask whether democracy is a reality when it is accompanied by the amount of unemployment, low wages, bad housing and the like, which have existed up to the present time. The peasants of Russia and of other countries are asking whether the land systems of the past are compatible with democracy. In a word, the aroused self-consciousness of classes heretofore submerged will force a widespread struggle over fundamentals of social organization and social policies."

We firmly believe that there is only one solution to these industrial problems. Christian principles applied by Christian men are essential. The Golden Rule without reservation must govern the actions of both employer and employee. It may work itself out in some form of coöperation, profit-sharing or industrial partnership, but a deeper sense of brotherhood,

as Christ taught it, will be the foundation of our industrial democracy, if it is to be safe.

And now, what about the agency in the establishment of a safe democracy? Just as truly as we look to Christ and his message for the principles, do we look to his church to place them in operation. We are sorry to say that the church as an institution has not received credit for the good it has accomplished. Bitter, indeed, is the criticism heaped upon the church by political economists and socialists. Much of this criticism is decidedly unfair. The church has no way of accurately measuring the splendid results attained. During the centuries of her existence she has proclaimed the gospel of brotherhood, has denounced injustice, and has sought the welfare of humanity. Under the inspiration of her teaching, and with the leadership of her adherents, the ideals of Christ have been worked into the daily life of humanity, and though no nation may be ideally Christian, where the church has had a reasonably fair chance, great changes affecting the welfare of humanity have been brought about.

But, on the other hand, we must honestly admit that the church has not been fully alive to the responsibilities and opportunities of the task confronting her. In this era of reconstruction, may we hope for better things? Unquestionably, much will depend upon her leaders. One charge against the church is that it has been buried too much in the past,—that it has been concerned with questions of “policies, and sacraments, and creeds, and liturgies,”—while great movement in reform of social and political institutions, and redressing of social wrongs are calling on it for leadership. Will this leadership be forthcoming in greater measure during the eventful years of reconstruction that are clearly upon us?

Professor Vedder voices the sentiment of many writers on the subject. He says: “The future progress of the church depends largely, perhaps mainly, on the ability and readiness of the ministry to read the signs of the times and become wise and progressive leaders. Hitherto the average minister has been too busy teaching others their duty to learn anything

about his own. Hence, the greater part of the clergy are still blind leaders of the blind. . . . The charge of insincerity so often made against the clergy is, however, absurd to any one who has a wide acquaintance with ministers. It is not merely unjust,—it is foolish. Precisely because the clergy are so sincere, the case of so many of them seems hopeless; their desperate sincerity in holding fast to the old prevents them from learning anything new.” But we resent the suggestion that any large percentage of the ministry are the hirelings of capitalism, or side with the exploiters of labor.

However, in the face of criticism of both church and ministry, we should not be discouraged. When all has been said of the church’s backwardness, and of the minister’s failings, it is still a fact that “the most powerful tonic influence felt by the moral consciousness of mankind to-day is the religion of Christ.” Wherever its ideals, its hopes and its conceptions penetrate, moral progress is apparent. Wherever they are temporarily or partially repudiated, there is retrogression. Could anything furnish a plainer illustration of this fact than the experience of Germany? The church, as the agency in developing a safe democracy, does not seek incorporation in the state as an established religion. Neither does it desire to dictate the specific laws that shall govern the relations of men. But the church and its ministry do seek to create and maintain the spirit out of which better laws for regulating the relations of men and nations shall proceed. For this reason, our task as ministers is little different from that of the last generation,—except that its dimensions have grown.

In conclusion, we affirm that the hope of democracy is a constitution the power of which is moral in character, and we firmly believe that the chief source of such power is in the Gospel of Christ. Men are yet willing to hear it. It is our glorious privilege to preach it. And at the same time that we are disseminating the ideals of a safe democracy, we are sowing the seed that shall have its fruit in the coming of God’s kingdom among men.

TOMS BROOK, VA.

VIII.

THE NEW IDEALISM IN THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION.

DAVID DUNN.

Idealism is something real. This fact serves as spring-board for our swim.

Now there are two gentlemen whom the sound of this statement is sure to outrage: the professional philosopher and the so-called "practical man." To both it seems an utter contradiction. A third friend also requires attention, he to whom this statement may sound all right but means nothing whatever. Let us deal with these three in order.

To the professional philosopher not only are idealism and realism sworn foes, but they are mutually expulsive and ultimately mutually exclusive, affecting each other as day and night, as heat and cold. As the one rises the other sets. As the one advances the other recedes. And it's idealism that now appears to be doing the setting. Suffice it to inform this critic that he and we have in mind quite different animals. His is the Idealism of the History of Philosophy: ours is that of the Philosophy of History. He has been tracing his as a strain of tendency, winding through Plato, Berkeley, Hegel, Bradley, Royce, a tendency to hold that in perception objects are known as ideas only. Let him call this "idea-ism" and leave "idealism" to ethics and to me.

But what is an *ideal*? There is about it a more personal reference than an *idea* possesses. Though an idea must be someone's, another may receive and entertain it. But an ideal seems more organically part and parcel of the individual's life. Mine is mine. Yours is yours. And so they remain, not constant, but ever ours.—Guiding, beckoning, drawing summaries

they are of those things that we regard as true and fair and good. Sometimes our ideals are embodied in actual persons. Just as often they are systems of relationship into which actualities will or will not fit and by which they are judged.

Now, all people, capable of any discrimination, are to be credited with these ideals. The ideals vary (1) as to texture or quality (we speak of folks with "fine and high ideals") and (2) as to the extent to which they affect the lives of their possessors. The boy passing from high or "prep" school is usually well supplied as to quality of ideal. The rub is felt when loyalty to that ideal begins to conflict with the urge of personal ambition, the drive of the competitive system, the zest for pleasure, the cravings of appetite and all such "allied and associate powers." What is then in progress is not a battle between the Ideal and the Actual nor even between the Ideal and the Natural (there are no such antitheses), but between the Ideal and every force that tends to cramp or choke it. *The espousal of the Ideal together with the life-effort to translate it to reality not only by living in its light but by forging with its flame things as they are into things as they ought to be, that—I take it—is Idealism.* It is not then a theory or a school of thought, not just the cherishing of conceptions of perfection, but a *type of living* forced toward and guided by the highest and best that one can think.

So far we have been presumably addressing the philosopher, but latterly we have also had in mind the incredulous gasp of the so-called "man of affairs," the desk-pounding business-prince as he protests our statement that *idealism* is something real. The very word seems to insult this worthy's sense of the practicable, the efficient, the safe-and-sane. But we shall have to ask him to stop looking at the present as a static and sufficient eternity. We shall have to bid him recognize in the achievements of the present the ideals of the past and in the ideals of "now" not only the promise but the roots of the triumphs of "after-while." And Idealism is idealism only when it issues in real life, when it guides and dominates the

activities of men. We hope that all the while that third fellow has been listening, he who, though quite prejudiced in Idealism's favor, accepts it easily as something fine with no clear idea as to what it is or how it works. His danger is that to him the word shall represent but vacuous generality and shall be used solely to round a period.

I. *What is the New Idealism?*—Our task is to understand this that we call the *New Idealism* that we may measure its stature, weigh its promises, check its excesses, harness and hitch it to the chariot of reconstruction.

Why do we call it "new"? Because somehow we feel that there is coming to expression in life just now a new type of *idealisms* based on more thoroughgoing conceptions of man's relation to God and to his fellow-men and consisting of a closer conformity of action to those conceptions.

This new Idealism wears trousers, or just as likely, skirts. Ideals, in order to come to expression and to induce idealism, need men and women. The cut of the trousers may be *more* or *less* modish, their hang *more* or *less* graceful, upon them the wisp may be *more* or *less* frequently used. This is only to say that Idealism moves and works in forms as various as the manners and methods of individuals. Of it, needless to say, there treads the earth no perfect embodiment. Yet you hear it, you see it, you feel it daily, more in some, less in others. With all this granted we must in our minds review many cases in quest of certain common characteristics. Here are some of the most distinguishing of them:

1. A lack of respect for old things because old, for traditional customs, methods, schemes of thought just because they have obtained and flourished.

2. A lack of reverence for and submissiveness to authority as such—a pressing behind the mace to examine the character of the procession that follows.

3. An expansive and a burning sense of justice, with a prophetic boldness in demanding it.

4. A great interest in and sympathy for "the under-dog,"

the poor, the weak, the oppressed; and conversely, a fierce antagonism to the "system" whose victims they are.

5. An urgency, an impatience for the righting of wrongs, yet a distrust of violence as a means to gain that end.

6. An ardor for true democracy in industry as well as in politics, a hatred of patronage and philanthropy as substitutes for fair dealing, and just returns to all producers.

6. A conviction that the Golden Rule can be used internationally, and that nations as well as individuals can be subdued by forgiveness and by love.

II. *What is its Function in Reconstruction?*—Now how fares this New Idealism in the Era of Reconstruction, which, it goes without saying, includes 1919 and stretches far into the mists ahead? Of the drama of Destruction the Great War was only one, though of course the vastest and most tragic scene. The tendencies which culminated in it were busy destroying faith, hope and love, years before the Serbian assassin fired. In reconstruction, therefore, something more is needed—and something greater—than grain and concrete and traction engines, viz., a big industrious Unselfishness that will seek the common good of the whole wide world rather than a Particularism that will pursue the path of acquisition for any nation however "civilized."

To promote this unselfishness of thought and policy and to build it into the structure of the post-bellum world-order, this was the self-imposed task of the new Idealism. Woodrow Wilson has been its outstanding herald. Majestic principles, august ideals for international dealing did he enounce. Fourteen points did he project in his assault on the old diplomacy and its treaty-making. The fettered peoples of central Europe drew from them encouragement to break their chains. Great popular associations, like the British Labor Party and the new idealists in every land, joined on these bases liberalism's drive. But the number of them proved yet too small. Especially in his home-land did the President lack the united backing which he so much needed in wrestling with Metternich's spiritual

successors. The result of the unequal struggle consists in fourteen points dulled or bent, the aims of liberalism thwarted by a voracious brood of imperialisms big and petty, and the new idealism mocked by a treaty the terms of which caused the resignations of several members of the American peace commission and provoked that noteworthy and heroic disclaimer by General Smuts. The Saar Valley, Shantung, the French treaty, guaranties taken but not given, one-sided disarmament, self-determination when it suits, exclusion of great peoples from the League, one only need mention these to feel how badly the New Ideals have fared in the first great step in international reconstruction.

Now with what have they clashed and what are the issues involved in the infra-national or domestic field in the beginnings of social, political, industrial reconstruction? Here the fighting has been and bids fair to continue along three main lines:

(1) Toward industrial democracy; (2) for freedom of speech, press and assemblage; (3) against universal military training, excessive armaments and other schemes for perpetuating the war-spirit and insuring re-action. Dealing first with the last-named issue, there is satisfaction in recording that there has been a sufficient hold of the new idealism on the present administration to prevent any foisting upon our land of an oppressive and un-American system of military mechanics. But democracy must, day and night, guard its borders against "offense societies" and "hysteria leagues."

The exigencies of war-time were sure to be used by the uneasy crowned heads of Big Business to protect themselves from those who agitate to shift from the people the burden of their sway. As is often remarked, free speech, free press and free assemblage are always the first three casualties. With the war no longer an available excuse its place is taken by alleged wide-spread anarchistic plots and there is forced through the Pennsylvania legislature an Anti-Sedition Law which gives to local judges the power to decide whether an utterance "*tends*"

to create discontent with our American form of Government. Why were the labor forces of the state in the fore of the attack upon this bill? No one who has followed the course of a strike will be slow to answer. Time and time again have just such statutes and ordinances been used in preventing labor-leaders from speaking, strikers from assembling, their leaflets from being distributed.

The new idealism demands, as long as industrial conflicts last, fair play for both contestants. The principles of collective bargaining and trade-unionism have been fully recognized by the Government. In the use of his only weapon, the strike, the workman must be protected against oppression at the hands of either the hired gunmen of the corporations or of municipal authorities, themselves often the tools of "the company." On the other hand this same idealism demands of trade-unionism not only that it observe the rules of the game that protect the public but that it eliminate the craft-caste distinctions and divisions and include all workers on a purely industrial basis.

But it does not resign itself to interminable economic conflict. It pleads for the only solution it can see, viz., industrial democracy under which each contributor to industry, each laborer as well as each stock-holder will have some voice on general questions of management as well as some responsibility. A recently circulated leaflet, by the Junior Rockefeller, the proposition known as the Plumb Plan for the ownership and control of railroads, the joint control experiments in Britain, and the work of shop committees in several of our largest factories, show that real reconstruction is "on," i.e., that our new ideals are marching toward reality.

That our "trousered idealism" is potent in these struggles and changes is beautifully illustrated in the recent Lawrence strike. The company had always discouraged organization of its thousands of workers, largely foreign. The Amalgamated Textile Workers of America attempted the task Amalgamated Textile Workers of America attempted the task only after the operatives had risen en masse, spontaneously and practically unled. The Chamber of Commerce and other busi-

ness alliances of the city, aided by the press with its lurid appeals to race prejudice, stirred up the city officials to a systematic persecution. Speakers, peaceful pickets, even out-of-town friends were clubbed often to insensibility. The attention of three young ministers of greater Boston was attracted and, vibrant with this new idealism, they plunged into the conflict. Their heads, too, were clubbed, but they won a fifteen per cent. increase in wages and the appointment of shop committees, besides doing much to control the strikers' passion and guide it from ways of violence. One of the clergymen now heads the national organization of the A. T. W. of A. What, of all this news, did we glean from our "newspapers" save scaring lines about strike-riots and "Bolshevism in America"?

In this struggle of idealism against "the system," we at least come to admire the system's far thrown line and we wonder whether it can be ever penetrated. But even these few instances of the new idealism in action make us recall that another line, not long ago, also Prussian in character and formation, gave way before what was originally "a thin red line."

What are the prospects for the New Idealism in *international life*? We have seen to what a slight extent it was able to work itself into the terms of settlement. We hear responsible English publicists like Norman Angell and H. N. Brailsford, stout proponents of the League of Nations, despairing to see permanent peace under a league inwrought with such a treaty. Many liberals, represented, *e.g.*, by the *New Republic* and the *Nation*, long supporters of the President, oppose any undertaking by America to share the obligations of maintaining it. Still others feel that however undesirable it is, the failure to ratify it and the wrecking of the League would constitute a far more disastrous débouche. Some think it possible that this same idealism, although it lost the peace, may aspire to so dominate the execution of its terms as to save Europe from another seed-time of hate and harvest of woe. This, many think, is the hope of the President, and all that keeps him from frankly admitting that he failed to secure what we

had begun to fondly call an *American* as distinct from a *European* peace.

One postulate of this New Idealism, upon which, whatever we may think of treaty or covenant, we must insist is the Christ-inspired, mutual good-will of all peoples. An insistence upon this means nothing less than bending every force to counteract the influence of the talk that seeks to reflect upon the friendship and the honesty of any of the Allied peoples. Chaplain Bassler told us at the Spiritual Conference Banquet of the old French mother scrubbing faithfully the floor of his room, symbolic of the France we would love. Let us seek similar pictures in the life of other nations rather than pass on mistrust-breeding tales. Burke's dictum is irrefutable: "You cannot indict a people." And hard as it may be to apply, the same holds true of our attitude toward peoples across the line. The New Idealism will have nothing of vengeance or hate. Forgiveness of the Germanic race, outraged more by the Hohenzollerns than any other, aid and counsel in the establishment of their republic, withdrawal from Russia and a ministry to her of understanding and relief rather than of blockades and bayonets, speedy inclusion of all powers in the League of Nations, the New Idealism dictates advance toward the achievement of such ends as these.

III. *The Church and the New Idealism.*—What shall they two do as toward each other during this time of reconstruction?

Let not the form in which we are stating this division of our subject cause anyone to think that we regard the two as distinct and mutually exclusive camps. Conceive them as circles and each includes a section of the other, as do the Roman Church and the American State.

Indeed, the fact that the Church does contain so many of these new idealists allied with the fact that the ideals of her Christ and He Himself as a personal Ideal have been so constitutive of modern ideals, ought to bring her and this idealism ever more closely in line with each other.

Unhappily, however, and disastrously, there have persisted misunderstanding, opposition and bitterness between many of the leaders of organized religion and those of the so-called radical, labor, or proletarian movements. Few sermons close without some fling at the latter. Fewer soap boxers descend till they have lampooned the Church. This antagonism was, if anything, increased by the war. The Church, through her spokesmen, too often seemed to be using the "patriotic test" upon radicals unfairly, while the sight of priests and preachers, satisfied and silent during the unending economic struggle, but very vocal and active in behalf of a nationalist cause, provoked a large element of labor to fierce attack.

But wherever we may go for explanation of this, whether to theories and prejudices of old-world rootings, or to friction caused now and here by alleged conflicting interests, we cannot be brought to feel that there is anything natural or necessary about it all. And particularly in view of the enormous duties of reconstruction should not both sides swallow the past and seek some common ground?

The Church's obligation to do her part and go her twain of miles must become very plain when the question is put like this:

In view of the tremendous struggle, now in its first stages, between the new idealism and the great tyrannous power of vested Privilege and imperialistic Grab, shall the Church falter one moment? It not the Cause at stake far more vital than Her own sensitiveness?

How shall she treat this New Idealism? Shall she abet the forces that are leagued to suppress or oppress its prophets, who speak at the street corner or at the lathe? Or shall she strive so to impress them with that full-orbed Ideal, Her Master, that they, in time, impressed into His service, may bring His Gospel as their message to mankind?

They themselves need it. The typical "radical," if such there be, is beset with some very real temptations. He too easily loses patience with those who have not thought so sharply

or so far as well as with those who, thinking along somewhat the same lines, yet adhere to some of the old forms and institutions. Baffled by delay and great hostility he sometimes yields to the impulse to blast his way toward his ends by force. He succumbs frequently to the easy theory of the Class Struggle with the fanaticism and bitterness it entails. Reversion to the freakish extravagance and megalomania of Greenwich Village is another open way of least resistance. And most disastrous of all his faith in God suffers a materialistic blight and even his trust in man is curdled with suspicion. Against such temptations the Church with Christ's religion can warn and warm, can feed and strengthen these pioneers, these radical enthusiasts of the New Idealism. And while she thus contributes to the success of the social struggle by steadying it and guiding it, the Church on her side will receive from it an impact and an impetus that will quicken her heart-beat and her pace for many a day. She and we, her sons, will be more adequately equipped to wage our battle at new and crucial salients.

Now we do not for one minute hold that our "new idealism" and the so-called "radicalism" are identical. The former, remember, we defined as a type of living and it is as absurd to think that any party or trend of thought should include all of it as to look for an individual in whom it is perfectly incarnate. But this much we do contend, that there is enough of this idealism in the various forms of this radicalism, even in that which is quite without the bounds of the Church, to make it possible and supremely worth while for the Church to strive to understand it, to secure a point of contact with it, and to cultivate it for the sake of Him, Her Master, whom it without reservation, honors. Are we doing our best along this line?

Not long ago I glimpsed this amazing headline:—"Presbyterians meet to fight Bolshevism." Two questions occurred to me in quick succession: "In such a fight what would be the issue?" and "what are the effects of such statements, now so common, upon the great masses of the proletariat?"

Now Heaven perhaps knows what that caption-maker meant and what most people mean when they talk of Bolshevism. "Perhaps," I say, because how can Heaven know when they don't know themselves. If the party, now in control of Russian affairs is meant, the sight of an American denomination planning warfare against a political organization of another land is a promising subject for a 20th century Cervantes. If, however, as is more likely, reference is made to those movements of great masses of discontented workers in our own land, then is fighting what is needed? Does the Church have a real issue in such a fight?

And the use of these labels and epithets to describe those whose social theories or economic program we don't like, besides being as futile as their use in theological discussion, is far more disastrous. The organized forces of Re-action, in command of the capitalistic system, have encouraged the application of the word "Bolshevist" to every move of the workers toward social justice. Everything is so that doesn't suit the *Wall St. Journal* and its satellite magazines. As a natural consequence many American workmen, with no interest at all in the destinies of the Soviets, have come to feel (not without cause) that when the American Tories use that word they are talking about them. Can the Church risk the use of a word that will give the impression that she, too, is fighting them?

It is time that we clear our minds and our vocabularies of the sediment from the stream of newspapers and popular periodicals, whose interest in discrediting the peoples' cause, both in Russia and here, is most obvious and explicable, and let the New Idealism, with its sense of fairness and desire for justice, flow through us for a while. Then let us begin to learn some things anew. A good way to begin on this particular subject would be the reading of a bulletin on the Russian question, issued not long ago by the Methodist Federation for Social Service, which would be corrective of certain of our ideas as to what Bolshevism is and has done in Russia, and then to continue with some text like Professor Ward's *The Gospel for a Working*

World, which clearly outlines the Church's relation to industrial problems at home.

A Brighter Day is Dawning.—The Church and the Forces without her seem actually drawing together, inspired, impelled by this New Idealism, and in turn expressing it: The Federal Council is sending representatives to the scenes of industrial conflict who impartially study the situation, seeking the truth. The report on the Lawrence strike did much to refute the impression of the Church's partiality to Capital as well as to settle the conflict itself.

If our own Church, in her Forward Movement, is to keep abreast of this New Idealism, must she not proceed with an explicit recognition of the demands of the workers for industrial democracy? Here and there, by doing so, she may lose a thousand dollars, but through that she will gain the tremendous momentum that come to those who march for the justice of God.

Somehow the impression has been confirmed in the Church and without her that the great conflict of the future, even now begun, is that between Radicalism and Religion. Do we want to admit this? Do we need to? Radical thought is that which cuts at the root of things. Is the Church afraid of her roots? You can understand such an ecclesiastical fear in the later Middle Ages, but surely not now. Rather must the Church think radically herself, fearlessly hewing to the bottom of every question, herself hacking away false roots before other Ingersolls pass and expose them and discredit her, accused of living by them. Let the Church gladly possess the word "*radical*" to describe her *thought methods* and no longer leave it to the conceit of those prejudiced against her.

All the while her *attitude* must be *liberal*, i.e., open-minded, willing to give and take, to live freely and tolerantly with all and to learn from all, not trying to smother adversaries by repression or to impale them on the horns of hateful names.

Nor is it paradoxical, when we understand the real meaning of the words, to declare that, though liberal her attitude and

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radical her thought, her *policy and program of action* must be *conservative*.

In these fateful days of reconstruction, we must not, in the zest of tearing away the outgrown and hindersome, fail to provide that which shall take its place. We need schools of training in this New Idealism where the youths of our land may bring out of the treasures of social experience, "things new and old," and where they may fit them into an ordered system which shall replace the ancient structure now fast rotting away. Then when the old beams of wood break and crash the new steel girders, firm and strong, shall seem to be shedding them like a shell.

Radical in thought, liberal in attitude, conservative in policy, the Church has nothing to fear from the onward surge of the New Idealism. It may catch her, bear her along, yes, reconstruct her with the rest, but even as this is being done, she can be guiding the course of the current, guiding it toward the goal her Christ set for Civilization, the established Kingdom of the Living God.

TURTLE CREEK, PA.

